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Establishing a framework to facilitate the transfer of clean technologies 
from developed countries to developing countries is one of the most 
challenging tasks that the international community has to tackle in order 
to prepare for the 2012 expiration of the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).1  The  
protocol aims to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, including carbon
dioxide,2 to at least five percent below 1990 levels during the 2008–2012 
commitment period.3  To this end the protocol sets binding emissions
targets for “Annex B” nations, a subset of nations listed under Annex I
to the UNFCCC.4 
Developing nations have reiterated that technology transfer is crucial 
to their efforts in reducing greenhouse gas emissions without compromising 
1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994). Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1997) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
2. The six primary greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4),
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur
hexafluoride (SF6).  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, Annex A. 
3. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3(1). 
4. “Annex B” nations refer to the United States and thirty-seven other industrialized
countries, including fifteen members of the European Union. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 
1, Annex B, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php (listing countries 
included in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol and their emissions targets).  All “Annex B”
nations but the United States have ratified the Protocol.  See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol Status
of Ratification, Jan. 14, 2009, available at http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_rat 
ification/application/pdf/kp_ratification_20090826corr.pdf. 
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their development needs.  In the Bali Action Plan, which was adopted in 
2007 to provide a roadmap for international negotiations on a post-Kyoto
agreement, developing countries agree to take measurable, reportable, and
verifiable actions regarding emissions, on the condition that developed
countries offer assistance to them with measurable, reportable, and 
verifiable financing, technology, and capacity building.  Developing 
countries warn that without advanced technologies their greenhouse gas 
emissions will remain unchanged for the next several decades.5 
What post-Kyoto framework should be established to facilitate the 
transfer of clean technologies to developing countries?  This difficult 
question is to be considered in December 2009 when parties to the
UNFCCC convene in Copenhagen to design a successor treaty to the
Kyoto Protocol.  The question cannot be fully answered without a deep
understanding of what actually drives such transfer.  Several analyses of 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects have shed some light 
on the topic.6  CDM is a market-based instrument under the Kyoto 
Protocol that allows industrialized countries with a greenhouse gas 
reduction commitment to invest in emissions reduction projects in the
developing world.7  Through these projects, these industrialized countries
can earn emission credits, known as Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs—a CER is defined as one metric ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (tCO2eq)), to satisfy their reduction commitments or to sell
them for profits.  As an alternative to undertaking more expensive emission 
reduction projects at home, the CDM provides a financial incentive to 
motivate industrialized countries to participate in CDM projects. In order 
to increase their chance of getting approved to run these projects, 
5. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the 
Parties, Thirteenth Session, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Decision 1/CP.13: Bali Action 
Plan, (1)(b)(i)–(ii), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf. 
6. See, e.g., Antoine Dechezleprête et al., Technology Transfer by CDM Projects: A 
Comparison of Brazil, China, India and Mexico, 37 ENERGY POLICY 703 (2009) [hereinafter 
Dechezleprête et al. 2009]; Antoine Dechezleprête et al., The Clean Development Mechanism 
and the International Diffusion of Technologies: An Empirical Study, 36 ENERGY POLICY
1273 (2008) [hereinafter Dechezleprête et al. 2008]; Stephen Seres, Analysis of Technology 
Transfer in CDM Projects, prepared for UNFCCC Registration & Issuance Unit CDM/SDM, 
Dec. 2008; H.C. De Coninck et al., Technology Transfer in the Clean Development 
Mechanism, ECN (Energy Res. Center of the Neth., Working Paper, ECNE–07–009, 2007),
available at http:www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2007/e07009.pdf; Erik Haites
et al., Technology Transfer by CDM Projects, 6 CLIMATE POLICY 327 (2006). 
7. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 12. 
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industrialized countries are often willing to transfer some of their clean
technologies to developing countries even though most host countries do 
not adopt technology transfer as mandatory.8 
Among published analyses of CDM projects, Dechezleprête et al.’s 
research stands out by offering an econometric analysis of 644 CDM
projects registered as of May 2007 which study the international transfer 
of clean technologies induced by CDM projects in Brazil, China, India,
and Mexico.9  The study identifies the pattern of technology diffusion in
these four major recipients of CDM projects. It finds, among other 
things, that the involvement of foreign partners in China’s CDM projects 
is less frequent and that China’s strong technological capabilities are 
positively correlated with the relatively high level of technology transfer 
to the country.  Why do foreign companies participate less frequently in 
China’s CDM projects? What contributes to China’s “strong 
technological capabilities”? Dechezleprête et al.’s study does not
address these and related issues.
This article takes a closer look at the case of China to fill the gap.  It
draws on numerous sources including Chinese laws and regulations, the
country’s policies on climate change, the country’s technological capabilities 
and business environment, observations made by CDM specialists, and 
other studies of CDM projects.  Such a comprehensive discussion, together 
with Dechezleprête et al.’s findings, will present a more complete picture of
what actually drives the transfer of clean technologies to China and will, 
therefore, help design an effective post-Kyoto framework to facilitate
international diffusion of clean technologies. 
This article focuses on the case of China for two reasons.  First, China 
is one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases10 and is a leading voice 
from the developing world to call for developed countries to uphold the 
UNFCCC’s core principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”
by, among other things, providing financial support and transferring 
8. For more discussion of how the adoption of technology transfer as a 
requirement in the CDM approval process affects the rate of CDM-related technology
transfer, see infra Part II.F.2.a.
9. See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6. In their article, the authors use the 
following terms interchangeably: “environmentally friendly technologies,” “environmentally
sound technologies,” “GHG mitigation technologies,” and “carbon mitigation technology.” 
Id. In this article, all of these technologies are referred to as “clean technologies.”  For a 
detailed discussion of the differences between Dechezleprête et al.’s research and earlier
studies, see id. § 1. 
10. See Press Release, Neth. Envtl. Assessment Agency, China Now No. 1 in CO2 
Emissions, USA in Second Position (June 19, 2007) http://www.pbl.nl/en/news/pressreleases/ 
2007/20070619Chinanowno1inCO2emissionsUSDinsecondposition.html; China Overtakes
U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 21, 2007. China disagreed. 
See Li Jing, China Issues Post-Kyoto Plans, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 30, 2008. 
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technologies to developing countries.11  A post-Kyoto framework that is
designed with comprehensive consideration of China’s domestic situation
for the transfer of clean technologies would significantly improve China’s 
environment and thereby that of the world.
Second, the international community has centered the discussion of 
the post-Kyoto framework on reforms or even abolition of the current 
CDM. A critical issue in the overall assessment of CDM’s contribution 
to sustainable development is CDM’s contribution to the transfer of 
clean technologies to developing countries.  As of September 25, 2009,
China hosts the largest number of CDM projects registered with the 
United Nations and is the largest supplier of CERs. Of all 1,831 registered 
projects, China hosts 635 projects. The expected average annual 
reduction from China’s registered projects is 188 million tons of carbon
dioxide equivalents, which accounts for 59% of the expected average 
annual reduction from all registered projects.  As of September 25, 2009, 
333 million CERs have been issued, 46% of which are for projects 
hosted by China.12  Given China’s important role in the CDM, a better 
understanding of the CDM’s contribution to the transfer of clean 
technologies to China is necessary for the full assessment of the value of
the mechanism.
Part I of this article outlines Dechezleprête et al.’s findings concerning 
China. Building on these findings, Part II analyzes the drivers of CDM-
related technology transfer to China.  The article concludes by previewing 
those lessons that other developing countries and the international 
community could learn from China’s experiences in order to create
favorable international and domestic environments for the transfer of
clean technologies. 
I. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
Dechezleprête et al.’s research assesses technology transfer through 
the CDM by analyzing all 644 projects registered as of May 1, 2007.  In
2008, the authors published their findings to answer such questions as 
11. See Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change, Part III, at 12 (Oct. 29, 
2008) available at http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File419.pdf
[hereinafter White Paper]; Cai Hong, Nation Calls for Technology Transfer, CHINA
DAILY, Apr. 29, 2009.
12. See UNFCCC, CDM Statistics: Registration, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/ 
Registration/NumOfRegisteredProjByHostParties PieChart.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2009).
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“how often do CDM projects include a transfer of technology from 
abroad?,” “in which sectors?,” “which types of technologies are 
transferred?,” “which countries are the main recipients?”, and “who are 
the technology suppliers?”13  That article also includes an econometric 
analysis of drivers of technology transfer through the CDM.  The research 
finds, among other things, that the probability of technology
transfer increases with the size of the projects and is 50% higher in 
projects implemented by a subsidiary of companies from Annex 1 nations. 
It also shows how host countries’ technological capabilities could influence
technology diffusion in the CDM.14 
Using the same data and similar econometric models, Dechezleprête et 
al. published in early 2009 an article on technology transfer through the
CDM in Brazil, China, India, and Mexico.  By May 1, 2007, these four 
countries had gathered approximately 75% of all the CDM projects.  The 
study finds that 59% of China CDM projects include international 
transfer of technology, compared with 12%, 40%, and 68% for India, 
Brazil, and Mexico, respectively.15 
The econometric analysis included in the study has identified a few 
drivers of international technology transfer to China.  Figure 1, adapted 
from a similar chart drawn by Dechezleprête et al., compares the impact
of each variable on CDM-related technology transfer.16  The findings 
relating to such variables as GDP_GROWTH, TECH_CAPABILITY, 
PROJECT_SIZE, CREDIT_BUYER, SUBSIDIARY, and CHINA are
briefly described below. More in-depth discussions of these and other 
variables are presented in Part II. 
1.  GDP_GROWTH, which measures a host country’s average 
annual rate of GDP growth: Investment opportunities generated
by China’s fast growing economy appear to be the decisive 
factor in the country’s ability to attract CDM projects involving 
technology transfer.17 
2. TECH_CAPABILITY, which indicates a host country’s 
technological capabilities: China’s strong technological 
capabilities are positively correlated with the country’s
relatively high level of technology transfer.18 
13. See Dechezleprête et al. 2008, supra note 6, at 1275–78. 
14. See id. at 1278–82. 
15. See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6.
16. See id. at 709.  Each bar in Figure 1 measures the impact of the variable on an 
average CDM project in China.  Dechezleprête et al. do not provide in their article the 
values represented by these bars.  This author measured the bars by computer software 
and reproduced Figure 1. 
17. See id. 
18. See id. at 710. 
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3. PROJECT_SIZE, which measures the log of the size of a
CDM project (expected annual reductions in ktCO2eq): Project 
size is found to have the third greatest positive impact on 
China CDM projects.19 











4. CREDIT_BUYER, which indicates whether or not a CDM 
project has one or more buyers of emission credits: In the 
case of China, the involvement of foreign credit buyers in a 
CDM project favors technology transfer but the resulting 
impact on the likelihood of technology transfer is less than 
that from GDP_GROWTH, TECH_CAPABILITY, and 
PROJECT_SIZE.20 
5. SUBSIDIARY, which indicates whether or not at least one
developer of a CDM project is a host country-based subsidiary
of a company from an Annex 1 nation: The involvement of 
China-based subsidiaries of companies from Annex 1 nations
has no impact on the CDM-related technology transfer to
China.21 
19. See id. at 709. 
20. See id. 
21. See id. 
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6. CHINA, a country dummy that captures factors not taken into 
account by other country-level variables, namely, GDP_ 
GROWTH, TECH_CAPABILITY, TRADE, FDI_INFLOWS: 
The econometric analysis shows that CHINA has significant 
negative impact on CDM-related technology transfer to China. 
Dechezleprête et al. conclude that factors captured by CHINA
play a strong role in explaining country differences.22 
Dechezleprête et al.’s econometric model correctly predicts 80% of 
the observations.23 Although the model is reasonably good, it, as
identified by the authors themselves, has several limitations. One 
limitation is that the authors rely on the description in the Project Design 
Documents (PDDs), which project developers must submit to the UN’s 
CDM Executive Board during the approval process, to decide whether a 
CDM project involves technology transfer.  For example, the import of 
goods (including generic devices such as DVD players) does not always
involve technology transfer, but if the PDD claims that it does, the 
authors consider that there is technology transfer.  As the existence of
technology transfer helps project registration, project developers have 
incentives to erroneously make this claim in the PDDs.  Because of this 
problem, descriptive statistics regarding technology transfer percentages 
may not be accurate.  But, with respect to the econometric results, the 
authors opine that “one can realistically assume that this bias is randomly
distributed over the PDD-writing population” and conclude that the 
problem “probably does not damage [the] econometric results.”24 The
fact that the econometric model correctly predicts 80% of the observations 
seems to support this conclusion.  Further, because technology transfer is
not in most cases a prerequisite for an approved CDM project, the
tendency for project developers to overstate the existence of technology
transfer may not be damagingly high.
Another limitation is that Dechezleprête et al.’s study does not cover
all forms of technology diffusion because the authors define the term 
“technology transfer” as the import of a technology from abroad, be it 
knowledge, equipment, or both.25 This narrower definition, as the
22. See id. at 709–10. 
23. See Dechezleprête et al. 2008, supra note 6, at 1280; Dechezleprête et al. 2009, 
supra note 6, at 708. 
24. See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 705. 
25. There is no single definition of technology transfer in international environmental 
law. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change defines “technology transfer” as 
“a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for
mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as governments, 
private sector entities, financial institutions, non-governmental organizations and research/ 
education institutions.” See IPCC Working Group III, Intergovernmental Panel on
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authors point out, excludes intra-country technology transfers, such as 
those from urban areas to rural areas. The authors adopt a narrower
definition because “intra-country transfers are difficult to track in PDDs,
and therefore they do not lend themselves easily to statistical analysis.”26 
In addition to the problems identified by the authors themselves, two 
other limitations should be noted.  First, Dechezleprête et al.’s study only
analyzes all 644 CDM projects registered as of May 1, 2007. At the 
time of writing this article, the total number of registered CDM projects 
has more than doubled.  Second, Dechezleprête et al. use the composite 
index developed by Archibugi and Coco (ArCo index)  to determine a 
country’s technological capabilities to import and use advanced technology. 
The Arco index, however, only covers years 1987–1990 and 1997–2000.27 
Many countries, including China, have advanced their technological 
capabilities since 2000. Thus, the reliance of the ArCo index may
compromise the accuracy of Dechezleprête et al.’s findings. 
To mitigate these limitations, this author draws on various sources to 
supplement Dechezleprête et al.’s findings. A good example is Seres’s 
study.28 In a report prepared for the UNFCCC, Seres analyzed the 
technology transfer claims in the PDDs of all 3,296 projects registered or 
proposed as of June 2008. The regression analysis used by Seres
correctly classifies 80% of the observations.29  This result is impressive, 
but, Seres’s study arguably has its own limitation because approximately
two-thirds of those 3,296 projects are in the pipeline, some of which may
not be approved in the end. On countries’ technological capabilities, 
more up-to-date data and relevant findings in the Seres’s study will be 
used for comparison.  Despite these efforts to mitigate the limitations, 
further research is warranted to enhance our understanding of CDM-
related technology transfer.  This author, therefore, identifies later in the 
article several areas that merit more research. 
Climate Change Special Report, Methodological and Technological Issues in
Technology Transfer, at 3 (2000), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/specialreports/s
pm/srtt-en.pdf.
26. Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 704. 
27. See Daniele Archibugi & Alberto Coco, A New Indicator of Technological
Capabilities for Developed and Developing Countries (Arco), 32 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
629 (2004).
28. See Seres, supra note 6. 
29. For a detailed explanation of Seres’s regression analysis, see Seres, supra note 
6, Annex A. 
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II. DRIVERS OF TRANSFER OF CLEAN TECHNOLOGIES TO CHINA
A. GDP_GROWTH 
1. Investment Opportunities Arising from Economic Growth 
According to Dechezleprête et al.’s econometric analysis, China’s 
relatively high transfer rate of 59%, in comparison with the rates in
India, Brazil, and Mexico, is mainly due to China’s dynamic economy
and its good technological capabilities.30  The next section will discuss 
China’s good technological capabilities.  This section focuses on China’s 
economic growth. 
The important role played by China’s fast growing economy in the
country’s ability to attract CDM projects involving technology transfer 
is consistent with the global trend. Dechezleprête et al. find that if a 
country’s average GDP growth increases by one percentage point, the 
likeliness of technology transfer to that country rises by 19%.31 
Since China launched its economic reform in the late 1970s, China has 
achieved annual average growth rates of 9.7%.32  In 2007, China’s GDP 
was $3.3 trillion, making China fall behind only the United States and 
Japan to become the third largest economy in the world.33  Dechezleprête et
al. attribute the important role of China’s fast growing economy in
CDM-related technology transfer to investment opportunities arising
from the economic growth.34  Indeed, because China offers companies
located in its territory the second largest domestic and export market in
the world, these companies can have extraordinary economies of scale 
and efficiency gains.35  The enormous market size is the main reason for 
China’s ability to become the 30th most competitive nation, while the 
other three BRIC economies—India (50th), Russia (51st), and Brazil 
(64th)—are ranked much lower.36 
The CDM market and the clean technology market in China are 
particularly attractive.  The global CDM market has increased to 
approximately $13 billion in 2007, a leap of more than 200% from
30. See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 710. 
31. See id. at 709. 
32. See World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2008–09, at 
27, available at http://www.weforum.org/documents/gcr0809/index.html [hereinafter 
GCR].
33. See J.R. Wu, China Overtakes Germany in GDP, Becomes Third-Largest Economy, 
WALL ST. J. (N.Y.), Jan. 15, 2009, at A6.
34. See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 710. 
35. See GCR, supra note 32, at 27.  The United States offers the largest domestic 
and export market. 
36. See id. 
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2006.37  By 2012, there will likely be over 8,000 registered or proposed
CDM projects, generating approximately 1.6 billion CERs.  Assuming
each carbon credit is worth $20, there will be more than $30 billion 
flowing into the developing world.38 China is expected to supply
approximately half of these credits.39 This means that the China CDM 
market could be worth approximately $15 billion.  With respect to 
China’s clean technology market, the U.S. government has estimated it 
to be worth $186 billion in 2010 and $555 billion in 2020.40  Since 2000, 
venture capitalists around the world have invested $10 billion in clean
technology, but less than 10% of this amount has been invested in
China’s clean technology companies.41  In fact, in 2008 clean technology
companies in China were able to raise only $430 million.42  All of this
means that much of the CDM and clean technology markets in China 
remains untapped.  It is, therefore, not surprising that companies of clean
technologies from developed countries are attracted to transfer some of 
their technologies through CDM projects in exchange for more
opportunities in China’s CDM and clean technology markets. 
2. Policy and Regulatory Framework 
China’s attractive CDM and clean technology markets are results of
the country’s policies, laws, and regulations that set ambitious energy 
efficiency and emissions targets.  An overview of a few major policies,
laws, and regulations in this area is illustrative. 
37. See Karen Capoor & Philippe Ambrosi, The World Bank, State and Trends of the 
Carbon Market, at 19 (2008), http://www.wds.woldbank.org/external/default/WDS
ContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/07/08/000333037_20080708060533/Rendered/PDF/446070A
R 0BOX321carbon0200801PUBLIC1.pdf. 
38. See Numbers of Projects World-Wide Registered or in Pipeline at Over 4,000 
Up From 60 in 2004 Says UNEP, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 11, 2008.
39. See Othmar Schwank & Madeleine Guyer, CDM IN CHINA: Contribution to
National and International Goals of Climate Policy (INFRAS, Research and Consulting, 
Conference Paper CH8045 Zurich, 2009), http://www.nccr-climate.unibe.ch/conferences/ 
climate_policies/working_papers/Schwank.pdf. 
40. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CLEAN ENERGY: AN EXPORTER’S GUIDE
TO CHINA, at 3 (2008), http://trade.gov/media/publications/ pdf/china-clean-energy2008.pdf 
[hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Commerce]. 
41. See Gary Rieschel, Clean Technologies Alluring to Venture Capital, CHINA
DAILY, Nov. 10, 2008. 
42. See Clean Technology Venture Investment Reaches Record $8.4 Billion in
2008 Despite Credit Crisis and Broadening Recession; Even With Diminished 4Q08
Results, Clean Technology Investment Fundamentals Remain Strong, BUSINESS WIRE, 
Jan. 6, 2009. 
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In the Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic 
and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2006–2010), 
China sets the goal to build a resource efficient and environmentally
friendly society.43  A specific benchmark identified by the government is
that the country has to reduce the energy consumption per unit of GDP 
by 20% by the year 2010 compared to that in 2005.44  To help local regions
meet this benchmark, the central government sets targets for every region. 
For example, Jilin province has to reduce its energy consumption per 
unit of GDP by 30%; Shanxi and Inner Mongolia by 25%; Shandong by
22%; Yunnan and Qinghai by 17%; Fujian and Guangdong by 16%; Guangxi
by 15%; Hainan and Tibet by 12%; and other provinces by 20%.45 
In June 2007 China adopted the National Climate Change Program, 
the country’s first plan on climate change.46  The program clearly states 
that the climate change issue shall be addressed through the advancement
and innovation of science and technology, and that strengthening the 
development and dissemination of advanced and suitable technologies is 
a major initiative.47  To give support to the program and to coordinate 
climate change-related scientific research and technological development, 
fourteen ministries and commissions jointly formulated the China’s 
Scientific & Technological Actions on Climate Change.48  Details about
these actions will be discussed later in this article.
China has established quite an impressive legislative framework to 
regulate climate change and environmental protection issues.  The Measures 
for Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism
Projects (Measures), which the rest of the article frequently refers to,
43. The Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social
Development (2006–10), adopted by the National People’s Congress in Mar. 2006, ch. 6 
(China), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/hot/t2006052971334.htm [hereinafter Eleventh Five-Year
Plan].  For a mid-term evaluation of these goals, see The World Bank, Mid-term Evaluation of 
China’s 11th Five Year Plan, at 111–29 (Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/CHINAEXTN/Resources/318949-1121421890573/China 11th_Five_Year_ 
Plan_main_report_en.pdf [hereinafter Mid-term Evaluation]. 
44. See Eleventh Five-Year Plan, supra note 43, at ch. 1. 
45. See Mid-term Evaluation, supra note 43, ¶ 4.8.
46. See National Development and Reform Commission, China’s National 
Climate Change Program (June 2007), available at http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/Web 
Site/CCChina/ UpFile/File188.pdf. 
47. See id. at 25, 35. 
48. See China’s Scientific & Technological Actions on Climate Change, jointly
issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology, the National Development and
Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
State Environmental Protection Administration, the State Forestry Administration, the
Chinese Academy of Sciences, the China Meteorology Administration, the National Natural
Science Foundation, the State Oceanic Administration, and the China Association for 
Science and Technology (2007), http://www.ccchina.gov.cn.WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/ 
File199.pdf (P.R.C.). 
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was promulgated in October 2005 to implement the CDM.49  A few
major laws adopted or amended in recent years are noteworthy.
First, the Law on the Promotion of Clean Production requires that 
“any units or individuals engaged in activities relating to production or
provision of services and their corresponding management agencies” 
must implement systems for cleaner production in accordance with the 
law.50  “Cleaner production” refers to, among other things, the utilization 
of clean energy sources, low-pollution technologies and production methods, 
and improved environmental management.51  To help implement the law, 
the State Council periodically issues a directory of production processes,
technologies, equipment, and products that must be eliminated within a 
fixed time limit.52  Any enterprise or individual who violates this law 
may be ordered to make rectifications or be fined.53  Serious violations
may also lead to criminal liability.54 
Second, the Renewable Energy Law promotes the development and 
utilization of renewable energy, including non-fossil energy such as 
wind energy, solar energy, water energy, biomass energy, geothermal
energy, and ocean energy.55  It gives priority to renewable energy when
transmitted on the state power grid and offers users of renewable energy
price discounts.56  To foster renewable energy development, the law 
creates a national fund to support various initiatives including scientific 
and technological research on renewable energy, as well as construction 
of renewable energy projects.57  It also authorizes financial institutions to 
49. Measures for Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism 
Projects (promulgated by the National Development and Reform Commission, the
Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Finance, effective Oct. 12, 2005), LAWINFOCHINA, translated at http://cdm.ccchina.go
v.cn/english/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=905 [hereinafter Measures].  The Measures replaced
the Interim Measures for Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism 
Projects issued on May 31, 2004. 
50. Law on the Promotion of Clean Production (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003), LAWINFOCHINA,
art. 3, translated at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=2388&key
word=clean%20production.
51. Id. art. 2. 
52. Id. art. 12. 
53. Id. arts. 37–41. 
54. Id.
55. Renewable Energy Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Feb. 28, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 1 and 2, translated at http://www. 
martinot.info/China_RE_Law_Beijing_Review.pdf. 
56. Id. arts. 13–23. 
57. Id. art. 24. 
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offer favorable loan conditions to renewable energy projects.58  To help
implement the law, the Mid- and Long-Term Renewable Energy Development 
Plan was issued to quantify policy targets for key renewable energy
technologies.59 
Third, the Energy Conservation Law,60 built on the 1997 Energy
Conservation Law, aims to “promote[] energy conservation in the whole 
society” and “enhance[] energy utilization efficiency.61  The revised law
bans the use of energy-intensive equipment,62 prescribes special
requirements for construction projects,63 requires public institutions to 
take the lead using energy-saving products and equipment,64 and 
provides tax incentives for companies using energy-saving technologies 
and products.65 
Fourth, the Circular Economy Promotion Law aims to promote the 
development of the “circular economy,” which is defined as a generic 
term for the reduction, reuse, and recycling activities in the course of
production, circulation, and consumption.66  The law, for example,
requires enterprises that produce products or packages listed on the 
catalogue of mandatory recycling to recycle the materials.  If recycling is 
not possible due to technological or economic restrictions, the enterprise 
must dispose of the materials in non-harmful ways.67  The law also 
requires enterprises in industries such as the electric power, petroleum 
processing, and building materials industries to use clean energy by the
time limit set by the state.68  The law authorizes tax preferences granted 
to industrial activities that promote the development of the circular
69economy.
These policies, laws, and regulations are quite impressive.  But if they
are not properly implemented to meet the prescribed targets, the actual
58. Id. art. 25. 
59. For a summary of these objectives, see U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 
40, at Tbl. A. 
60. Energy Conservation Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Apr. 1, 2008), LAWINFOCHINA, translated at http://www.
lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=6467&keyword=energy%20conservation%
20law. 
61. Id. art. 1. 
62. Id. arts. 16–17, 51. 
63. Id. arts. 34–40. 
64. Id. arts. 47–51. 
65. Id. arts. 60–67. 
66. Circular Economy Promotion Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2008, effective Jan. 1, 2009), LAWINFOCHINA, arts. 1, 2, translated
at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=7025&keyword=Circular%20Ec 
onomy%20Promotion%20Law.
67. Id. art. 15. 
68. Id. art. 21. 
69. Id. art. 44. 
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sizes of China’s CDM and clean technology markets will not be as 
attractive as speculated. According to the World Bank’s mid-term
evaluation of China’s implementation of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, 
the country’s progress on the environmental objectives has been mixed.
China has made insufficient progress in reducing energy intensity 
mainly because the efficiency gains from technical advancement and 
closure of inefficient capacity are still limited.  Further, capital-intensive 
and high-energy-using industries continue to outgrow other parts of the 
economy.  On building a more resource efficient and environmentally
sound economy, China has made some, but not significant, improvements 
in reducing air and water pollution, increasing water use efficiency, 
treating industrial solid waste, and expanding forest coverage.  The 
World Bank has called for various remedial measures, including better
enforcement of regulatory standards in this area.70 
To help implement the abovementioned polices, laws, and regulations
by promoting more investment in clean technologies, China’s central 
government issued the Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue 
(2007 Amendment) (2007 Catalogue).71  A major policy objective of this
Catalogue is to promote resource conservation and environmental 
protection by restricting or prohibiting FDI in high-pollution and high-
energy-consumption projects and by encouraging FDI in environmental 
and energy-saving technologies. 
The 2007 Catalogue explicitly identifies three groups of industrial 
sectors, namely, “encouraged” (e.g. the production of environmentally 
friendly chemical fibers such as cellulose fibers using new solvent methods),
“restricted” (e.g. the exploration for, and mining of, special and scarce
coals), or “prohibited” (e.g. the establishment and operation of nature 
preserves and internationally important wetlands).  Any industrial sector
that is not specifically identified falls by default into the “permitted” 
70. See Mid-term Evaluation, supra note 43, ¶¶ 12, 23, 27, 28, 39 of the Executive 
Summary and chs. 4, 7. 
71. Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (2007 Amendment) 
(promulgated by the State Dev. and Reform Comm’n and the Ministry of Commerce of 
the P.R.C., Oct. 31, 2007, effective Dec. 1, 2007), LAWINFOCHINA, translated at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=6483&keyword=foreign%20invest 
ment. For a discussion of the 2007 Catalogue, see Thomas Y. Man et al., Foreign
Investment Industry Catalogue: New Revisions & Alignment with National Development 
Strategy, CHINA L. & PRAC., Dec. 2007/Jan. 2008; Paul McKenzie, China’s Updated
Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalog—Encouraging Clean Tech in the 
Middle Kingdom, in China Clean Tech Bulletin—Feb. 2008, reprinted in MONDAQ
BUSINESS BRIEFING, Mar. 3, 2008. 
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category.  Foreign investors are banned from investing in “prohibited” 
industries. But they can invest in “restricted,” “permitted,” and “encouraged” 
(arranged in decreasing order of restrictions) projects so long as they
obtain the appropriate level of government approval and comply with
applicable restrictions on foreign ownership.  Since the issuance of the 
2007 Catalogue, China’s Ministry of Commerce has made a major shift 
in the foreign investment approval policy by delegating much of its
power in this area to lower level authorities.  As a result, most foreign 
investment projects can now be approved at the local level.  This is
generally welcome because obtaining an approval from the Ministry of 
Commerce could be burdensome and time consuming.72 
The exact impact of the 2007 Catalogue and the Ministry of 
Commerce’s delegation of approving authority on the investment in
clean technologies remains unclear.  But the impact is expected to be
generally positive, even though the magnitude may have been reduced 
because of the global financial crisis. To minimize the negative impact
of the crisis on foreign investment, the Chinese central government has 
decided to spend $142 billion of its $570 billion stimulus package in the 
next three years on environmental improvements.73 These steps, together 
with China’s ability to do much better than most other countries during 
the current crisis,74 suggest that China will likely continue to provide
attractive investment opportunities for companies of clean technologies. 
72. The Ministry of Commerce has issued several circulars to delegate its power. 
See Notice on Further Enhancement of the Approval Scheme for Foreign Investment
(promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce of the P.R.C., effective Mar. 5, 2009); 
Notice on Delegation of the Approval Authority on Establishment of Foreign Invested
Holding Companies (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce of the P.R.C., effective 
Mar. 6, 2009); Notice on Further Simplifying and Regulating the Foreign Investment 
Administration (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce of the P.R.C., effective Aug. 
26, 2008); Notice on the Delegation of Approval on the Alteration of Foreign Invested 
Joint Stock Companies and Foreign invested Enterprises (promulgated by the Ministry of
Commerce of the P.R.C., effective Aug. 11, 2008); Notice on the Delegation of
Approval Authority on Foreign Invested Commercial Enterprises (promulgated by the
Ministry of Commerce of the P.R.C., effective Sept. 12, 2008); Notice on the Approval 
Matters relating to the Foreign Invested Venture Capital Enterprises and Foreign 
Invested Venture Capital Administration Enterprises (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Commerce of the P.R.C., effective Mar. 5, 2009).  See Jonathan Zhou et al., Handing 
Down Authority for Foreign Investment, CHINA L. & PRAC., Apr. 2009, at 20; Charles
Comey et al., MOFCOM Further Delegates Foreign Investment Approval Authority, 
Apr. 2009, http://www.mofo.com/international/CN_en/news/15423.html. 
73. See Achim Steiner, Reflections, in  OUR PLANET (United Nations Env’t 
Programme), Feb. 2009, at 3.  For a list of measures that China’s State Council has 
issued to boost the economy, see Several Opinions of the General Office of the State 
Council on Providing Financial Support for Economic Development (promulgated by the 
General Office of the State Council, effective Dec. 8, 2008). 
74. See World Bank, China Quarterly Update (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.
worldbank.org/china. The World Bank analyzes that China can do much better than 
most other countries during the financial crisis because the country “does not rely on 
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3. Climate Change Perceived As An Economic Development Issue 
All of the above policies, laws, and regulations in China underscore its 
central government’s emphasis on energy efficiency and environmental 
protection, and the use of clean technologies to tackle these problems.
Although the U.N. Development Program has recommended in the
2007/2008 Human Development Report, Fighting Climate Change: 
Human Solidarity in a Divided World that “[m]ajor emitters in developing 
countries. . . aim at an emissions trajectory that peaks in 2020, with 20 
percent cuts by 2050,”75 China is not bound to do so.  Why has China 
been so proactive in setting a wide range of climate change related goals, 
some of which exceed even efforts in the developed world? 
A major underlying reason is that the Chinese central government
perceives economic development, China’s ultimate goal since it adopted 
the opening-up policy in the late 1970s, as the “core objective” of
dealing with the climate change issue.  In the white paper titled China’s 
Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change, the Chinese central
government explicitly states: 
Taking economic development as the core objective, and placing emphasis on
energy conservation, optimization of the energy mix, reinforcement of ecological
protection and construction, and scientific and technological progress as backup, 
China strives to control and mitigate the emission of greenhouse gases and 
continuously enhance the capability of adapting itself to climate change. 
(emphasis added)76 
Such perception is reflected in the institutional structure for handling 
climate change issues in general and CDM projects in particular. 
Since the late 1990s, China’s climate change policy has been mainly
overseen by the central government’s National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC),77 a powerful government agency whose primary 
task is to advance the country’s economic development.  Before that the 
responsibility was in the jurisdiction of China’s State Meteorological 
Administration.  This institutional change strongly signaled that climate 
external financing and its banks remain generally unscathed by the international financial
turmoil” and because “[China] has the fiscal and macroeconomic space to implement 
forceful stimulus measures.” Id. 
75. See United Nations Development Programme, 2007/2008 Human Development 
Report: Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World, at 17, 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf. 
76. See White Paper, supra note 11, at Foreword. 
77. The National Development and Reform Commission was formerly named the 
State Development and Planning Commission. 
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change had shifted from being a scientific issue to an economic 
development issue.78 
The subsequent establishment of high-level groups on climate change 
shows that Chinese leaders see the significant impact of climate change
on the nation’s economic development and find it necessary to have
senior officials hold the helm.  The first group was announced when the 
National Climate Change Program was released.  This group is chaired
by Premier Wen Jiabao and reports directly to the State Council.  The 
second group is headed by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and is responsible 
for international work on climate change.79 
With respect to the CDM program, several governmental agencies and
authorities are involved in the approval, registration, and management of
CDM projects.80 The National Coordination Committee on Climate Change
(NCCCC) reviews and coordinates China’s national CDM policies and
rules.81  Established under the NCCCC is the National CDM Board (the
Board).82 The NDRC and the Ministry of Science and Technology are
co-chairs of the Board, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the 
vice chair.  Other board members include the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection,83 the China Meteorological Administration, the Ministry of
Finance, and the Ministry of Agriculture.84 The Board, as explained in 
Part II.C., plays important roles, which include conducting reviews of 
CDM applications, CER prices, and CDM project activities. 
Apart from its role in the Board, the NDRC is also China’s Designated 
National Authority for CDM.  In this capacity, the NDRC acts as the key
interface between the authorities and project participants.  Specifically, it 
accepts CDM project applications and approves CDM project activities 
jointly with the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs on the basis of the conclusion made by the Board.  It 
78. See Joanna I. Lewis, China’s Strategic Priorities in International Climate 
Change Negotiations, 31 WASH. QUARTERLY 155, 158 (Winter 2007–08), http://www. 
twq.com/08winter/docs/08winter_lewis.pdf.  See also Tseming Yang, The Implementation
Challenge of Mitigating China’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL L.
REV. 681, 687–88 (2008). 
79. See Chinese Foreign Ministry Sets Up Climate Change Int’l Working Group, 
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 5, 2007, cited in Lewis, supra note 78, at 159, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-09/05/content_6667432.htm. 
80. For detailed discussion of China’s CDM approval process, see infra Part II.C. 
81. Measures, supra note 49, art. 14. 
82. Id. art. 13
83. During China’s recent restructuring of its central government, the State 
Environmental Protection Administration, China’s equivalent to the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, was granted full cabinet status to become the Ministry of the
Environmental Protection. See Highlights of China’s Institutional Restructuring Plan, 
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 15, 2008, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
03/15/content_7797293.htm. 
84. Measures, supra note 49, art. 15. 
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also issues an approval letter for the application and supervises the 
implementation of CDM project activities.85  This institutional structure 
of China’s CDM program again shows the prominent role of the NDRC 
and reflects Chinese leaders’ perception of climate change as an economic
development issue. 
The direct link between climate change and economic development is 
further emphasized in a white paper titled China’s Actions for Disaster
Prevention and Reduction released by China’s State Council in May 
2009.86  The report summarizes that every year from 1990 to 2008, natural
disasters on average affected about 300 million people and resulted in
direct financial losses of more than RMB200 billion.  The report concludes
that “now and for a fairly long time to come, the risks of extreme
weather phenomena are increasing along with global climate changes”
and sets forth a few measures, including advancement of scientific and 
technological support capability, to cope with the challenges.87 
The enormous economic loss that could be caused by climate change
and the threat to the power of the ruling Chinese Communist Party if it 
fails to meet its people’s demand for a cleaner and safer environment
leave the Chinese leaders with no option other than acting proactively in 
setting a wide range of climate change related goals.  These concerns
also explain the central government’s continued efforts, as described 
above, in promoting investment in clean technologies during the global 
financial crisis. 
B. TECH_CAPABILITY 
1. “Strong Technological Capabilities”
Dechezleprête et al. find that China’s strong technological capabilities 
are positively correlated with the country’s relatively high level of 
technology transfer.  The authors rely on the ArCo technology index to 
conclude that China has “[s]trong technological capabilities.”88 The 
ArCo index captures three aspects to determine a country’s technological 
capabilities: (a) the creation of technology (number of patents and
number of scientific articles); (b) the technological infrastructures (internet 
85. Id. art. 16. 
86. See “Full Text” of China’s White Paper on Disaster Prevention, BBC MONITORING
ASIA PACIFIC—POLITICAL, May 12, 2009. 
87. See id.
88. See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 710. 
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penetration, telephone penetration and electricity consumption); and 
(c) the development of human skills (percentage of tertiary science and
engineering enrollment, mean years of schooling and literacy rate).89  As
mentioned in Part I, the ArCo index does not cover developments after 
the year 2000.  It is, therefore, helpful to refer to more up-to-date data to 
decide whether or not China does have “[s]trong technological capabilities.”
The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 2008–2009 sheds some light
on China’s technological capabilities. One of the twelve pillars of 
competitiveness is technological innovation, which captures seven items:
a. capacity for innovation (25/134),90 
b. quality of scientific research institutions (37/134),91 
c. company spending on R&D (24/134),92 
d. university-industry research collaboration (23/134),93 
e. government procurement of advanced technology products 
(20/134),94 
f. availability of scientists and engineers (52/134),95 and 
g. patents for invention (54/134).96 
Overall, China’s “technological innovation” is ranked 28th among the 
134 economies included in the study.97 The individual ranking of each of 
the seven items is included in the brackets. For example, China’s 
“capacity for innovation” is ranked 25th among the 134 economies.98 
China’s “technological innovation” is the third most significant factor in 
making China become the 30th most competitive nation in the world.99 
The two most significant factors are China’s market size (2/134) and
macroeconomic stability (11/134).100 
The more up-to-date GCI Index does, therefore, give support to
Dechezleprête et al.’s finding that China has “strong technological 
capabilities.”  One may argue that if China has “strong technological 
capabilities,” China has enough technologies and does not need to rely
on international transfer of clean technologies.  In other words, Dechezleprête 
et al.’s conclusion that China’s “strong technological capabilities” are 
89. See id. at 708. 
90. See GCR, supra note 32, at 486.
91. See id. at 487. 
92. See id. at 488. 
93. See id. at 489. 
94. See id. at 490. 
95. See id. at 491. 
96. See id. at 492. 
97. See id. at 134–35. 
98. See id. at 486. 
99. See id. at 134–35. 
100. See id.
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positively correlated with the country’s relatively high level of technology
transfers sounds incorrect. The correlation should be negative. 
This argument is flawed because Dechezleprête et al.’s conclusion 
about China is made after taking into account the “two antagonistic 
effects of technological capabilities.”101 According to Dechezleprête et
al., on the one hand, a country’s technological capability favors international 
technology transfer because this means that local implementers have  the 
skills to use the transferred technologies for their CDM projects.  On the 
other hand, high technological capabilities may imply that the technologies
required for the CDM projects are available locally.  To find out the net 
result of these two effects, Dechezleprête et al. add another variable, 
SIMILAR_PROJECT, to measure the number of other CDM projects that
use the same technology within the host country.  The more similar 
projects a host country has, the less likely international technology 
transfer takes place.102 
Dechezleprête et al.’s econometric analysis shows that the mitigating 
effect of SIMILAR_PROJECT is the strongest in the case of India,
compared with the other countries of China, Brazil, and Mexico.  As a 
result, the net effect of technological capabilities in promoting technology 
transfer is the lowest in India.  The authors find that India has been
particularly successful in employing its technology capabilities to diffuse 
clean technologies acquired through the CDM within the nation. Once 
these technologies are available locally, the need for having them 
transferred internationally is lowered. The authors conclude that this is 
the main reason for India’s lower rate of international technology transfer 
(12%), compared with that in Brazil (40%), China (59%), and Mexico 
(68%).103 
Seres sheds more light on the impact of similar projects in a host 
country.  In his regression analysis of all 3,296 CDM projects registered
or proposed as of June 2008, Seres, like Dechezleprête et al., includes a
variable to measure the number of previous CDM projects of the same
type in a host country.  The variable is found to have significant impact 
on the trends of technology transfer to the host countries.  He finds that 
China has shown an overall downward trend from having a relatively
high technology transfer rate of 55% for the first 854 projects to 16% for 
101. See Dechezleprête et al. 2008, supra note 6, at 1281. 
102. See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 708. 
103. See id. at 710. 
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the last 1,003 projects (see Table A).  This indicates that technologies
transferred in earlier CDM projects are diffused locally and thus later
projects of similar types can rely more on local knowledge and 
equipment.104 
TABLE A 
PERCENTAGE OF CDM PROJECTS IN CHINA WITH  
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (TT) 
Project Number* 1–854 855–2,293 2,294–3,296 
% of Projects
 with TT 55 34 16




* Project number is based on the date when the project entered the pipeline. 
Seres also finds that China has evolved to be a source of clean
technologies.  This is likely the combined result of both China’s gradual 
improvement in its innovation and the diffusion of technologies 
transferred to China through earlier CDM projects or other investments.
Table B, tabulated in accordance with data reported in Seres’s study,
shows the sources of technology transferred through CDM projects.
Each source of technology transfer is credited with the estimated annual 
emission reductions of the project.105  Seres identifies three types of 
CDM projects involving technology transfer: transfer of equipment, 
transfer of knowledge, and transfer of both equipment and knowledge. 
Some projects involving technology transfer do not specify the sources.
When these projects are excluded from calculations, 93% of the equipment
and 99% of the knowledge transfer come from Annex I parties (see 
Table B). Among the sources other than Annex I parties, Brazil, China,
India, Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan are found to be the most 
104. See Seres, supra note 6, § 13, at 15–16.  Seres does not discuss how these
technologies are diffused locally.  Nor does he suggest whether host countries’ inadequate 
protection of intellectual property rights may have expedited such technology diffusion. 
See infra Part II.F.2.c. for a discussion of inadequate protection of intellectual property 
rights.
105. See Seres, supra note 6, § 9, at 11. 
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important sources.  Interestingly, China’s new role of being a source of
clean technologies has also captured the attention of the New York
Times, whose coverage of China is usually critical.  According to the 
newspaper, China has emerged over the past two years to be a leading 
builder of more efficient and less polluting coal power plants, and has 
been building one plant of this type per month, on average.106 
While China’s evolution to be a source of clean technologies is 
encouraging, one must note that it only contributes 0.32% of all the 
transfers of equipment and 0.07% of all the transfers of knowledge (see 
Table B). This suggests that in spite of its improvement in technological 
innovation and its ability to diffuse some technologies acquired through 
earlier CDM projects, China does not have many technologies that can
be transferred.  In fact, one pillar of the GCI 2008–2009 is “technological 
readiness,” which captures such items as availability of latest technologies
(83/134).107 Overall, China’s “technological readiness” is ranked 77th among 
the 134 economies, lagging behind other BRIC countries, namely: Brazil 
(56th), Russia (67th), and India (69th).108  Interestingly, in terms
of “technological innovation,” China (28th) leads Brazil (43rd), Russia 
(48th), and India (32nd).109 China’s different positions in “technological
innovation” and “technological readiness” among the BRIC countries 
indicate that although China’s efforts in improving the country’s
innovation are impressive and will benefit the country in the long run,
these efforts have not immediately turned the country into one with 
ready access to the latest technologies.  Other BRIC countries that have
not accomplished as much as China in improving their own “technological
innovation” may still improve their short-term competitiveness by
adopting existing technologies elsewhere. 
106. See Keith Bradsher, China Far Outpaces U.S. in Building Cleaner Coal-Fired
Plants, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2009, at A1. China has developed the capacity to manufacture
supercritical boilers, a key component of these coal power plants.  I thank Michael Wara,
Assistant Professor of Stanford Law School, for sharing this comment. 
107. See GCR, supra note 32, at 460. 
108. See id. at 114, 134, 188, 288. 
109. See id.
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Transfer of Total 
TABLE B 
SOURCES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS (KTCO2/YEAR).   
THIS TABLE IS TABULATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH       
DATA REPORTED IN SERES’S STUDY 
Equipment Knowledge Equipment & Knowledge Equipment % of total Knowledge %of totat 
only only Equipment Knowledge (= A+ C) (= B + D) 
(Column A) (Column B) (Column C) (Column D) 
Annex 1 party 
Australia 323.00 0.00 348.00 422.00 671 .00 0.40 422.00 0.34 
Austria 2,613.00 0.00 1,211.00 1,189.00 3,824.00 2.26 1,189.00 0.95 
Belgium 1,259.00 61 .00 853.00 572.00 2,1 12.00 1.25 633.00 0.51 
Canada 0.00 19.00 4,833.00 8,023.00 4,833.00 2.86 8,042.00 6.44 
Czech Republic 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Denmark 2,838.00 130.00 4,190.00 5,869.00 7,028.00 4.16 5,999.00 4.81 
Europe 1, 907.00 65.00 1,699.00 1,515.00 3,606.00 2.13 1,580.00 1.27 
Finland 6.00 347.00 130.00 139.00 136.00 0.08 486.00 0.39 
France 236.00 574.00 14 668.00 19 046.00 14 904.00 8.82 19 620.00 15.72 
Germany 8,027.00 15,780.00 16,350.00 15,8 73.00 24,377.00 14.43 31,653.00 25.36 
Iceland 0.00 0.00 37.00 37.00 37.00 0.02 37.00 0.03 
Italy 0.00 600.00 1,503.00 2,359.00 1,503.00 0.89 2,959.00 2.37 
Japan 27,025.00 1,262.00 17 ,125.00 17 ,193.00 44,1 50.00 26.13 18,455.00 14.78 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 3,050.00 2,288.00 3,050.00 1.81 2,288.00 1.83 
Nethertands 52.00 1,404.00 3,462.00 3,071 .00 3,514.00 2.08 4,475.00 3.58 
New Zealand 0.00 0.00 169.00 1,559.00 169.00 0.10 1,559.00 1.25 
Noiwav 13.00 0.00 351 .00 351 .00 364.00 0.22 351 .00 0.28 
Poland 0.00 0.00 67.00 51 .00 67.00 0.04 51.00 0.04 
Romani a 26.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Russia 478.00 136.00 0.00 0.00 478.00 0.28 136.00 0.11 
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 67.00 51 .00 67.00 0.04 51.00 0.04 
Spain 1, 975.00 132.00 2,210.00 2,106.00 4,185.00 2.48 2,238.00 1.79 
Sweden 199.00 0.00 2,155.00 282.00 2,354.00 1.39 282.00 0.23 
S.11itzerland 13.00 1,150.00 258.00 794.00 271 .00 0.16 1,944.00 1.56 
United Kinqdom 5, 198.00 252.00 7,216.00 7,000.00 12,414.00 7.35 7,252.00 5.81 
USA 9 263.00 4 417.00 13 940.00 7 460.00 23 203.00 13.74 11 877.00 9.51 
Subtotal 61, 501.00 26,329.00 95,892.00 97 ,250.00 157,393.00 93.17 123,579.00 99.00 
Non-Annex 1 oa.rtv 
Argentina 0.00 0.00 67.00 51 .00 67.00 0.04 51.00 0.04 
Brazi l 426.00 49.00 317.00 359.00 743.00 0.44 408.00 0.33 
China 317.00 0.00 230.00 88.00 547.00 0.32 88.00 0.07 
Costa Rica 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 
El Savador 0.00 0.00 0.00 140.00 0.00 0.00 140.00 0.1 1 
India 33.00 96.00 195.00 132.00 228.00 0.13 228.00 0.1 8 
Malaysia 163.00 0.00 141 .00 114.00 304.00 0.18 114.00 0.09 
Mexico 11 .00 0.00 19.00 38.00 30.00 0.02 38.00 0.03 
Singapore 0.00 0.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 0.01 22.00 0.02 
SouthAfiica 39.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 39.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
South Korea 4,248.00 0.00 1,221 .00 163.00 5,469.00 3.24 163.00 0.13 
Taiwan 4,033.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 4,033.00 2.39 0.30 0.00 
Thai land 58.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 58.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Subtotal 9,328.00 145.00 2,212.00 1, 107.60 11,540.00 6.83 1, 252.60 1.00 
Total 70,829.00 26,474.00 98,104.00 98,357.60 168,933.00 100 .00 124,831 .60 100 .00 
All of this means that China’s “strong technological capabilities,” an 
expression used by Dechezleprête et al., does not imply that China has 
enough technologies for CDM projects and thus needs not rely on 
international technology transfer.  The expression merely suggests that 
China has desirable technological skills to facilitate technology transfer.  
Thus, Dechezleprête et al.’s conclusion that China’s “strong technological 
capabilities” are positively correlated with the country’s relatively high 
level of technology transfers is logical. 
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2. Emphasis on Science and Technology 
China’s relatively strong technological capabilities stem from 
the country’s emphasis on science and technology.  The Scientific & 
Technological Actions on Climate Change stipulates explicitly that
“science & technology shall play a basic and leading role in response to
climate change.”110  It further identifies some targets to be met by 2020. 
For example, it vows to “significantly improve the capability for making
independent innovations in the research on climate change,” to “make 
breakthroughs in and wider applications in social and economic sectors 
of key technologies related to GHG emission control and climate change 
mitigation,” and to “notably enhance the adaptive capacity of key sectors 
and typical venerable areas in response to climate change.”111 
A set of recent data appears to show that China’s pledges are 
supported by actions.  From 2001 to 2006, China gradually increased its 
research and development (R&D) expenditure from approximately 1% 
of its GDP to almost 1.5%.  The World Bank concludes that if this 
increasing trend continues, China’s target of spending 2% of its GDP on
R&D by 2010 can be achieved.112  Specifically, in 2006/2007, China’s
gross domestic expenditure on R&D was reportedly $48.8 billion, 
putting the country behind the United States ($343.7 billion), Japan
($148.5 billion), and Germany ($73.8 billion), but far ahead of the other 
BRIC countries such as Brazil ($10.9 billion), India ($4.9 billion), and
Russia ($10.6 billion).113  In 2006, China granted 57,786 invention
patents, behind only the United States (173,770), Japan (141,399), and 
Korea (120,790).114  The number of R&D centers established in China
by foreign companies has grown from 124 in 2001 to 1,160 in early
2008.115 
110. China’s Scientific & Technological Actions on Climate Change, supra note 48, 
Part III, at 4.
111. Id.
112. See Mid-term Evaluation, supra note 43, ¶ 3.29, at 27. 
113. See  MINISTRY OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY OF P.R.C., CHINA SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY STATISTICS DATA BOOK 10 (2008) (quoting sources from OCED and 
UNESCO), http://www.sts.org.cn/sjkl/kjtjdt/data2008/cstsm08.htm (follow “6 International 
comparison,” Chart 6–1).
114. See id. at Chart 6–5. 
115. See China Industry: Wanted: Clean-Tech Firms, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE
UNIT, Sept. 5, 2008, http://www.newwavemarkets.com/country_markets/china/china_industry
_wanted_cleantech_firms. 
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As for climate change related activities from 2001 to 2005, China invested
more than RMB2.5 billion in scientific and technological research concerning 
climate change through national science and technology plans such as
the National Hi-tech R&D Program and the National Basic Research
Program.  By 2007, these plans had obtained more than RMB7 billion to 
focus their research on energy conservation and emission reduction.116 
In addition, China has formed a team of over 1,000 specialists from 
different disciplines to focus on climate change research.117 
China’s commitment to science and technology does not seem to be
affected by the global financial crisis.  As stated in the 10 Point Stimulus 
Plan, the government places emphasis on “infrastructure and other
investment, although of a different nature than 10 years ago, with many
projects geared to broad long term development needs.”118  The Chinese 
government plans to spend RMB370 billion on technological innovation 
from the fourth quarter of 2008 until 2010.  As part of the 10 Point
Stimulus Plan, China has announced 10 sector-specific plans, many of
which focus on environmental or energy efficiency.  For example, the
government plans to spend RMB500 billion in 2009/2010 in the 
petrochemical sector to upgrade refineries and improve the quality of 
fuel used.119  Further, in May 2009 the Chinese government and the
European Union signed the “China–EU Programme on Scientific and 
Technological Partnership” to deepen their scientific and technological 
collaboration in such fields as climate change, energy conservation and 
emission reduction, and the development of new energies.120 
It should be noted that the driving force of China’s science and 
technology has extended from the Chinese government to business 
enterprises. For example, from 2003 to 2006 the share of R&D funding 
contributed by business enterprises increased by nine percentage points, 
while that by the government decreased by slightly over five percentage 
points. The growing role of business enterprises in China’s scientific
and technological development is largely due to these enterprises’ efforts 
in strengthening their innovative power to ensure their sustainable 
competitiveness in the global market.121  In an attempt to further encourage
enterprises to fund R&D activities, China’s State Administration of 
116. The Chinese government launched the National Hi-tech R&D Program and the 
National Basic Research Program in 1986 and 1997, respectively. See White Paper, 
supra note 11, pt. IV, at 27–28. 
117. See China’s Scientific & Technological Actions on Climate Change, supra note 48, 
at 3, pt. II.3. 
118. The World Bank, China Quarterly Update—March 2009, supra note 74, at 17. 
119. See id.
120. See Tian Fan, Minister Praises China–EU Technology Partnership, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC—POLITICAL, May 23, 2009. 
121. See Mid-term Evaluation, supra note 43, ¶¶ 3.29–.30. 
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Taxation issued in December 2008 new rules to allow the pre-tax
deduction of qualified enterprises’ R&D expenses.122 
C. PROJECT_SIZE
1. Findings Obscured by HFC-23 Projects 
Dechezleprête et al. find technology transfers in 43% of the 644
registered projects, which account for 84% of expected annual emissions 
reductions. The large difference between the two percentages indicates
that projects with technology transfer are, on average, substantially
larger than those without.  This observation is partly due to the existence 
of 13 HFC-23 destruction projects, which involve technology transfer 
and represent more than 59 million tons of annual CO2eq reductions. 
HFC-23 is produced during the manufacturing process of HCFC-22, an 
ozone-friendly refrigerant. Because the global warming potential of
HFC-23 is 12,000 times higher than that of carbon dioxide, HFC-23
destruction projects generate enormous amounts of CERs.123 
When this small number of mega-sized HFC-23 destruction projects is
excluded from calculations, Dechezleprête et al. find that 42% of the 644 
projects, which account for 71% of expected annual emissions reductions, 
involve technology transfer.124  The large difference between 42 and 71, 
along with the econometric analysis of all 644 projects, shows that 
technology transfer does increase with the size of the project.125 
For the case of China, Dechezleprête et al. find project size to have the
third greatest positive impact on CDM-related technology transfer (see 
Figure 1). The average size of Chinese projects is much larger because
China, a host country for most HFC-23 destruction projects, has had, by
the time the authors conducted their analysis, seven huge projects of this
type, which account for 80% of the country’s annual reductions.  Each of 
these seven projects uses technologies transferred from France or 
Japan.126 
122. Measures for the Administration of the Pre-tax Deduction of the Research and 
Development Expenses of Enterprises (Trial Implementation) (issued by the State
Administration of Taxation, Dec. 10, 2008, effective Jan. 1, 2008), translated at CHINA L.
& PRAC., Mar. 2009. 
123. See Dechezleprête et al. 2008, supra note 6, at 1275–76. 
124. See id. at 1275. 
125. See id. at 1279–80. 
126. See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 706. 
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Seres’s econometric analysis of 3,296 registered or proposed CDM 
projects also shows that project size has a positive impact on 
international technology transfer.  Seres finds technology transfers in
36% of these 3,296 projects, which account for 59% of the estimated
annual emission reductions.  Seres also analyzes separate groups of these 
3,296 projects, including small-scale projects,127 projects hosted by
different countries, and projects of different sectors such as solar and
hydro projects.  He finds that within any group, technology transfer is 
still more common for larger projects.128 
The above discussion shows the importance of excluding HFC-23
projects from the calculations because mega-sized HFC-23 projects
could obscure the relationship between the project size and the rate of
technology transfer.  Another important reason for doing so is that although 
most HFC-23 projects involve international technology transfer, these 
projects have been criticized for undermining the value of the CDM, and 
grouping them with other CDM projects would boost the overall rate of
technology transfer, making it difficult to see the transfer rate of more
valued CDM projects. 
There are four main criticisms directed against HFC-23 projects.129 
First, the technologies used in these projects are simple and end-of-pipe; 
the actual value of these projects in improving energy efficiency or in 
advancing sustainable development is thus limited.  Second, these 
projects could provide perverse incentives for companies to produce 
more HFC-23 because the profits these companies could make through 
the enormous amount of CERs far exceeds the costs spent on destroying
HFC-23. According to one study, HFC-23 destruction costs CDM
127. Simplified modalities and procedures are provided for small-scale CDM projects.
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCC], 1st Sess., 
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, decision 
4/CMP.1, Annex II, FCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://cdm.
unfccc.int/Reference/COPMOP/08a01.pdf#page=43. The definitions for small-scale CDM
project activities referred to in paragraph 6 (c) of decision 17/CP.7 was revised by “Further 
Guidance Relating to the Clean Development Mechanism” (decision 2/CMP.3), http:// 
unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cmp_guid_cdm.pdf  (advanced
unedited version). 
128. See Seres, supra note 6, §§ 4, 7.
129. See, e.g., International Climate Change Programs: Lessons Learned from the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme and the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism, GAO REPORTS, Nov. 18, 2008 (RPT-NUMBER: GAO-09-151), at 45–46 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]; Michael W. Wara and David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on 
International Carbon Offsets, 11 (Stanford Univ. Program on Energy and Sustainable 
Development, Working Paper No. 75, 2008). See generally Michael Wara, Measuring
the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
1759 (2008); Craig Hart et al., East Asia Clean Development Mechanism: Engaging East
Asian Countries in Sustainable Development and Climate Regulation Through the CDM, 
20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL L. REV. 645, 649–50 (2008); and Yang, supra note 78, at 690–91. 
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project developers less than $115 million, but payments to refrigerant 
manufacturers, investors, and China, the host country, will total 
approximately $5.3 billion.130 
Third, HFC-23 projects should not be approved in the first place 
because they violate the CDM’s principle of additionality.  According to 
the Kyoto Protocol, emissions reductions from any CDM project must 
be “additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified
project activity.”131  Thus, project developers cannot obtain CERs for
business-as-usual emissions reductions.  They must show that the project
would not be economically viable without funding through the CDM 
program.  As discussed above, HFC-23 projects are inexpensive to 
implement and could be viable outside the CDM structure.  Finally, the 
enormous amount of CERs issued by HFC-23 projects drive down the 
price of carbon credits, making other valued projects such as renewable 
energy projects that require more upfront investment less economically 
viable under the CDM.  As a result, less investment can be made in these 
valued projects. 
2. Challenging CDM Approval Process
The positive correlation between project size and CDM-related 
technology transfer is, as explained by Dechezleprête et al., due to the 
ability of larger projects to exploit economies of scale in technology 
transfer.132  The overly strict CDM approval process, as discussed below, 
has been criticized for causing large transaction costs and high financial
risks in CDM projects. These are major impediments to potential
developers of smaller projects, many of which are renewable energy
projects and could promote the transfer of valued technologies.
The approval process of CDM projects takes place both at the 
international and national level and is regulated by the Kyoto Protocol, 
the Marrakech Accords,133 the CDM Executive Board, and the host
country’s domestic regulations.  In the case of China, the owner of a 
130. See Wara & Victor, supra note 129. 
131. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 12(5)(c).
132. See Dechezleprête et al. 2008, supra note 6, at 1280; Dechezleprête et al. 2009, 
supra note 6, at 708. 
133. The Marrakech Accords prescribe in detail rules of meeting the targets 
stipulated in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 7th
Sess., Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21 2002), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a02.pdf. 
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typical CDM project has to go through the following steps from 
application to receipt of CERs:
1. The project owner alone, or with its foreign partner, submits to 
the NDRC the project application and other documents
including the PDD.134 
2. An expert review of the project is conducted by relevant 
organizations appointed by the NDRC.  This review shall be 
concluded within 30 days.135 
3. After the expert review, the NDRC submits the project
application to the National CDM Board.136 
4. Based on the conclusion made by the Board, the NDRC, the
Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs jointly approve or reject the project, and the 
NDRC issues an approval letter accordingly.137  A decision on 
any project application must be made by the NDRC within 
twenty days (excluding the expert review period) as of the date 
of accepting the application, unless the Chair or the Vice-chair
of the NDRC allows to extend the time limit to thirty days.  If
this happens, the NDRC must inform the project applicant of 
this decision and its reasons.138 
5. After the project is approved by the Chinese authorities, a 
Designated Operational Entity (DOE), a private third party 
accredited by the CDM Executive Board, will validate the 
project for registration. The DOE validates the application of
the relevant methodology and certifies the project’s compliance 
with the applicable rules and modalities.  Once these requirements 
are met, the project developer may submit a request for
registration with the CDM Executive Board. In practice, the 
project is then reviewed by the CDM Registration and Issuance
Team for compliance with the applicable methodology.139 
6. The project owner must, within ten days from receiving notice 
from the CDM Executive Board, report to the NDRC the 
Executive Board’s decision.140
 134. Measures, supra note 49, art. 18, ¶ 1. 
135. Id. art. 18, ¶ 2.
136. Id. art. 18, ¶ 3.
137. Id. art. 18, ¶ 4.
138. Id. art. 18, ¶ 5.
139. Id. art. 18, ¶ 6.  I thank Michael Wara, Assistant Professor of Stanford Law 
School, for his detailed explanation of this step. 
140. Measures, supra note 49, art. 18, ¶ 7. 
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7. Once the project is registered with the Executive Board, the 
project participants are allowed to implement it.  A different
DOE is responsible for auditing and certifying requests for 
issuance of reduction emissions.  Within fifteen days upon the 
DOE’s issuance of the certification report, the Executive Board 
will issue CERs accordingly.  The NDRC in China will keep
records of the issued CERs.141 
The first CER issuance for China CDM projects usually takes place
one to two years after the NDRC receives the project application.142 
Since it only takes fifty to sixty days to get an approval (or a rejection) 
from the Chinese authorities (see Steps (1) to (4)), the bottleneck
apparently exists in the international leg of the entire process.  The 
estimated time of one to two years is consistent with the findings 
reported in a recent study.  The study points out that the first CER
issuance for a CDM project typically takes place one year after it is
registered with the Executive Board.  Adding the time needed to go from 
submission of the application to registration (less than a year, as pointed 
out by the same study) means that the first CER issuance for a CDM
project, regardless of the host countries, usually takes place one to two
years after the project application is submitted.143 
The process is not only long but also costly.  It is estimated that
$80,000 to $230,000 is needed to go through all the steps from project 
preparation to registration with the CDM Executive Board.  Once the
project is registered, an amount of $20,000 to $35,000 is needed to 
implement it during the first year and $15,000 to $25,000 per year for 
subsequent years.144  Worst of all, going through such a lengthy and
costly process does not guarantee that the project will be registered or 
issued with the expected CERs. The risks involved discourage investment
141. Id. art. 20.  See also Olivier Dubuis, Clean Development Mechanism Projects
in China, CHINA L. & PRAC., Nov. 2006. 
142. See Dubuis, supra note 141. See also Chris Wright, Green Finance: Cleaning
Up in China,  EUROMONEY, Sept. 2007 (reporting from interviews with China CDM 
specialists that “getting from signing a contract to seeing a credit takes 18 months to two 
years”).
143. See GAO REPORT, supra note 129, at Figure 8.  I am grateful to Michael Wara,
Assistant Professor of Stanford Law School, for sharing the following comment: “In
practice, many projects that have received registration much longer than two years ago 
have yet to request CER issuance and may never do so because they are under water with 
respect to transaction costs or non-CDM related implementation barriers.”
144. See GAO REPORT, supra note 129, at Figure 8.
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in smaller projects, many of which are renewable energy projects, the 
types that would otherwise have benefited from the CDM most. 
The CDM has taken some measures to remedy the situation.  For 
example, they have adopted simplified procedures for small-scale 
projects,145 increased the Executive Board’s supporting staff, and 
allowed similar projects to be bundled in one application.146 Yet the 
backlog problem remains.  By April 2007, the Executive Board accepted
82% of proposals and ultimately approved over 96%. But in the
following year, those figures fell to 57% and 87%.147 
The real problem lies in the project-by-project approval process that 
involves strict review to ensure that the project meets the additionality 
requirement, a major reason for half of the rejected applications.  Some
CDM stakeholders suggest that the process be made less onerous by 
scrapping the additionality requirement.  They argue that additionality is 
unworkable because it is based on projections of what would have
occurred in the absence of the CDM, which no one can estimate with 
certainty.  These CDM stakeholders prefer clear technical standards for
qualification.148 The dissatisfaction with the project-by-project application 
of the additionality rule has grown since it was revealed that these
meticulous efforts fail to screen out such non-additional projects as the 
HFC-23 projects.149 
D. CREDIT_BUYER 
Dechezleprête et al. find that the involvement of foreign credit buyers 
favors CDM-related transfer of clean technologies to China. This is 
consistent with the global trend. According to Dechezleprête et al.’s 
calculations, a project with a credit buyer has a 16% higher probability 
of involving technology transfer than one without.  The authors attribute 
the credit buyers’ positive impact on technology transfer to their ability
to help CDM project developers overcome financial barriers. As
discussed above, before project developers can sell their CERs, they 
145. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 127. 
146. See A Moment of Truth: Climate Change, THE ECONOMIST, May 17, 2008. 
The number of staff members has reportedly increased from twelve in 2005 to eighty-
two as of May 2008.  See Terry Wang, Programmatic CDM projects in China, CHINA
ENERGY WEEKLY, Aug. 6, 2008. 
147. See id; China’s Carbon Market Hit by Regulatory Uncertainties, XINHUA
FINANCIAL NETWORK NEWS, July 29, 2008. 
148. See id; GAO REPORT, supra note 129, at 39–42. 
149. See, e.g., id. at 40–41; Tony Parkinson, How the Smart Guys are Making a
Killing Out of the Carbon Credits Trade, THE AGE (Austl.), Aug. 5, 2008, http://www. 
theage.com.au/business/how-the-smart-guys-are-making-a-killing-out-of-the-carbon-
credits-trade-20080804-3q05.html; Wara & Victor, supra note 129. 
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have to go through a lengthy and costly process.  Selling credits through 
a forward contract helps reduce these developers’ financial burdens.150 
Although the involvement of foreign credit buyers favors technology 
transfer to China, the resulting impact of such involvement is less than
that from GDP_GROWTH, TECH_CAPABILITY, and PROJECT_SIZE
(see Figure 1). This is largely because China does not offer favorable
terms to optimize involvement from credit buyers and the resulting 
impact is thus limited. 
There are three major restrictions imposed on credit buyers.  The first
one concerns ownership of CERs and revenue sharing.  Article 24 of the 
Measures states that “emission reduction resource” is owned by the 
Chinese government and the “emission reductions” generated by a CDM
project belong to the project owner. It continues to provide that “revenue 
from the transfer of CERs shall be owned jointly by the Government of 
China and the project owner,” with the government taking different
percentage of CER transfer benefit from different types of projects.  For 
example, the government takes 65 percent of CER transfer benefit from 
HFC projects, 30 percent from N2O projects, and 2 percent from CDM 
projects in priority areas such as energy efficiency improvement.  This 
means that no one, including credit buyers, can enter into a contract with
the owner of a China CDM project to “own” immediately a portion of 
CERs generated by a CDM project or share the proceeds from sales of
those CERs. In practice, credit buyers obtain CERs through a transfer of
ownership from the CDM project owners but such a transfer already
invokes Article 24 and the government can take certain percentages of
CER transfer benefit.  All of this is in effect a tax on CDM projects that 
affects the viability, and thereby the attractiveness to credit buyers, of 
CDM projects.151 
Second, China’s review of CER price, which should depend on the 
risks assessed by individual credit buyers, creates uncertainty for these 
buyers.152  Article 15(1) of the Measures requires China’s national CDM
board to review the CER price when it examines CDM project activities.
The authorities have claimed that there is no fixed base price and that the 
price review aims only at ensuring that the CER price is fair to the 
150. See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 708. 
151. See Rebecca Zhang, A Guide to Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
Projects in China, CHINA L. & PRAC., Nov. 2007; DLA Piper, China And The Clean
Development Mechanism (2007).
152. See, e.g., Dubuis, supra note 141; DLA Piper, supra note 151. 
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project owners. But, in practice, the NDRC was found to be reluctant to
accept projects with CER price under $9-10/tCO2eq, even at a time when 
$7-8/tCO2eq should be considered acceptable.153  This kind of practice 
has caused widespread belief that China does have a base price, which,
as of February 2009, is rumored to be EUR 8 ($10.39).154 
Third, the mechanism in place does not give credit buyers an incentive 
to be involved in a project prior to registering with the Executive Board. 
Each prospective project owner must provide the NDRC with either an
emission reduction purchase agreement or a letter of intent from a credit
buyer to prove the CER price agreed to be paid by the buyer.  Based on 
such proof, the board reviews the CER price.  In reality, credit buyers 
are reluctant to commit to a transaction price without knowing the exact 
volume of CERs the project can generate.155  They are also reluctant to 
be bound to pay the full price because the mechanism in China does not 
allow discount for advanced payment.156 
E. SUBSIDIARY 
According to Dechezleprête et al.’s analysis, the involvement of
China-based subsidiaries of parent companies from Annex 1 countries 
has zero impact on China CDM projects (see Figure 1).  This does not
follow the global trend, which indicates that the likelihood of technology
transfer is 50% higher if a CDM project is implemented by the 
subsidiary of a parent company from an Annex 1 nation.  Dechezleprête 
et al. attribute the significant impact of the involvement of subsidiaries
to assistance from their parent companies, ranging from helping manage
the CDM registration to providing easier access to capital and 
technological expertise.157  But the authors did not explain their finding
about China.
China has shown such a different trend from the global pattern mainly
because Chinese law prohibits foreign enterprises from having majority
ownership of CDM projects. Article 11 of the Measures states that 
“Chinese funded or Chinese-held enterprises within the territory of
China are eligible to conduct CDM projects with foreign partners.”
Arguably, this provision only affirms the eligibility of Chinese funded or 
153. See Dubuis, supra note 141; Jing Yang, China to Raise CER Floor Price This 
Year Due to Renminbi Appreciation, CHINA ENERGY NEWSWIRE, Apr. 2, 2008.
154. See Terry Wang, CORRECTION: Ecos Carbon Finds Niche As CDM Financing 
Trend Shifts, CHINA ENERGY NEWSWIRE, Feb. 13, 2009. 
155. See Dubuis, supra note 141. 
156. See  WILLIAM CHANDLER & HOLLY GWIN, FINANCING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN 
CHINA 15 (Carnegie Energy and Climate Program Report Dec. 6, 2007). 
157. See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 708–09; Dechezleprête et al. 
2008, supra note 6, at 1282–83. 
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Chinese-held enterprises to conduct CDM projects with foreign partners,
and it does not necessarily disqualify foreign enterprises from having 
majority ownership of CDM projects. But any remaining doubt is 
cleared by Article 17 of the Measures, which points out that “project 
owner” only refers to “Chinese funded or Chinese-held enterprises.”158 
A “Chinese-held enterprise,” as further clarified by China’s Ministry of 
Science and Technology, is an enterprise with at least 51% of the shares 
held by Chinese parties.159 This means that foreign investors cannot hold
more than 49% of shares of the CDM project company in China.  The 
ownership restriction strongly discourages China-based subsidiaries of 
companies located in Annex 1 countries from getting involved in CDM
projects because foreign parties normally want, through their majority
holding, to control technology transfer or other technical challenges 
involved in the projects.160 As a result, the impact from these subsidiaries on
international technology transfer to China, compared with other drivers
of technology transfer, is negligible.  Over the past years, investors have 
pushed for the elimination of this restriction.161 
Other restrictions in China exacerbate the problem.  These include the
prohibition on foreign investors to collect an interest rate commensurate 
with risks involved on any shareholder loan made by the investors and 
the prohibition on foreign investors’ preferred stock investment to stop 
them from getting a priority return on investment.162  Although the latter
prohibition could in theory be overcome by establishing a Cooperative 
Joint Venture (CJV) to explicitly specify in the agreement priority
investment return to the foreign investor,163 officials in charge of China’s
CDM have reportedly confirmed that such CJVs are not allowed to
 158. Measures, supra note 49, arts. 11, 17. 
159. Notice Concerning Recommending CDM Projects (issued by the Ministry of
Science and Technology, effective Mar. 23, 2005). 
160. See Dubuis, supra note 141; Zhang, supra note 151. 
161. See, e.g., European Investors Pushing against Barriers in Chinese Energy 
Sector, CHINA ENERGY NEWSWIRE, Sept. 10, 2008 (referring to a position paper prepared 
by the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China that specifically calls for the
elimination of the 51% rule); Too Many Restrictions in China’s Carbon Market–Trader, 
XINHUA FINANCIAL NETWORK NEWS, Dec. 4, 2007. 
162. See CHANDLER & GWIN, supra note 156, at 12–13. 
163. Measures for Examining and Approving the Advance Recovery of Investment 
by Foreign Partners of Chinese and Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures (promulgated by
the Ministry of Finance, June 9, 2005, effective Sept. 1, 2005), LAWINFOCHINA 
translated at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=4340&keyword= 
Measures%20for%20Examining%20and%20Approving%20the%20Advance%20Recovery.
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develop CDM projects.164  China’s new Company Law has prompted 
discussions that a “preferred stock” structure may be possible under the 
new regime.165 But the lack of explicit reference to the two-class stock 
structure in the new Company Law makes it unlikely that Chinese CDM
authorities will change its stance to allow foreign investors’ priority
investment return.
Prior to the adoption of the new foreign exchange rule in 2008, the 
control over foreign investors’ ability to repatriate foreign exchange was 
another restriction.166  Given that China has changed from a country with
scarce foreign currency to a nation with $1.95 trillion foreign exchange 
reserves,167 China’s 1996 Regulations for the Control of Foreign Exchange 
was revised in August 2008 to control the inflow, instead of the outflow, 
of foreign currency.168 
These restrictions reflect China’s protectionist tendencies by resisting 
foreign ownership in sectors perceived to have impact on national 
economic security, even though such ownership would help access to
technologies.169  In fact, according to the GCI Report, on the item
“prevalence of foreign ownership,” China is ranked 105th out of the 134 
economies, demonstrating that foreign ownership of companies in China
is not as encouraged as in other economies.170  China’s prohibition on 
foreign ownership of CDM projects stems particularly from its concern 
over foreign exploitation of rights to ownership of emission credits, 
which the Chinese government considers to be a “national resource.”171 
This concern, together with the suspicion that developed countries would 
use the mechanism to avoid their own responsibilities to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, largely explains China’s initial resistance to
support the CDM.172  This attitude has not changed even though China
has benefited economically and politically from the CDM and has thus 
become a great supporter of the CDM.173  Economically, the CDM has
164. See CHANDLER & GWIN, supra note 156, at 13. 
165. See Greg L. Pickrell & Judy J. Deng, Preferred Stock Structure: Theoretical
and Practical Issues of Implementation in Chinese Foreign-invested Enterprises, CHINA 
L. & PRAC., Oct. 2008. 
166. See CHANDLER & GWIN, supra note 156, at 11–12. 
167. See China’s Foreign Reserves Hit $1.95 Trillion at End of March, CHINA DAILY, 
Apr. 11, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-04/11/content_7668745.htm. 
168. Regulations for the Control of Foreign Exchange (2nd Revision) (promulgated
by the State Council, effective Aug. 5, 2008), translated in CHINA L. & PRAC., Oct. 2008, 
at 77.
169. See Lewis, supra note 78, at 164. 
170. See GCR, supra note 32, at 432. 
171. CHANDLER & GWIN, supra note 156, at 16.  See also Lewis, supra note 78, at 
164–65. 
172. See Lewis, supra note 78, at 164. 
173. See id. 164–65. 
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brought into China investment on emission reduction projects and clean
technologies, whereas politically, the CDM allows China to be seen as 
proactive on the climate change issue.174 
Added to all of the above restrictions imposed on foreign investors is a 
barrier created by local governments. Article 18(1) of the Measures 
specifies, without elaboration, that local governments may facilitate the 
CDM project application.175 In practice, local governments play a
decisive role in choosing partners for projects implemented in their 
localities. Foreign companies generally do not have as good relations 
with local governments as local companies do, and foreign companies’ 
chances of being chosen to implement a CDM project could thus be
lower. This barrier to foreign investors manifests the problem of local 
protectionism practiced by local governments, a problem that has been
extensively discussed in literature on doing business in China.176 
One would argue, however, that the favoritism for local companies 
should be outweighed by local officials’ interest in gaining access to
foreign advanced technologies to tackle environmental challenges, an
achievement that will help their promotion.177  Findings of a study of
eighty-five power plants across fourteen different provinces in China
suggest that the current demand for advanced equipment in some 
localities is actually not strong.  The study shows that many of these 
plants have not fully utilized their advanced equipment because they 
have to cut costs to counter the pressure resulting from rising fuel prices 
and government-set feed-in pricing.  These plants, therefore, have either
not operated some advanced equipment or used a cheaper but 
substandard fuel that renders the equipment ineffective.178  Amid the
current financial crisis, local officials’ favoritism for local companies is 
174. See id.; Weijun Gao et al., Possibility and Potential of Clean Development
Mechanisms in China, ENVTL. RES. LTR. 2, Oct.–Dec. 2007, at 2, available at
http://www.iop.org/ EJ/journal/erl; Chris Wright, Green Finance: Cleaning Up in China,
EUROMONEY, Sept. 24, 2007. 
175. Measures, supra note 49, art. 18(1). 
176. See, e.g.,  ANDREW H. WEDEMAN, FROM MAO TO MARKET: RENT SEEKING,
LOCAL PROTECTIONISM, AND MARKETIZATION IN CHINA (2009); Chong-En Bai et al.,
Local Protectionism and Regional Specialization: Evidence from China’s Industries, 63 
J. INT’L ECON. 397 (2004). 
177. For a discussion of the linkage between China’s achievement in tackling
environmental challenges and the performance appraisal system for local governments, 
see Mid-term Evaluation, supra note 43, at ch. 7, ¶ 7.38. 
178. See Edward S. Steinfeld et al., Greener Plants, Grayer Skies?, MIT INDUS.
PERF. CTR., Aug. 2008, at 23–24, http://web.mit.edu/ipc/publications/pdf/08-003.pdf. 
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expected to increase because of these officials’ overriding concern about 
keeping local companies afloat and lowering the unemployment rate.179 
Even if foreign companies are chosen to develop CDM projects, the
lack of strong relations with local governments may hinder the project 
implementation so much that some projects reportedly stop halfway,
causing tremendous loss to foreign investors.180  These negative experiences
may have further discouraged cautious foreign investors from getting 
involved in CDM projects and, therefore, lowered their potentially
positive impact on technology transfer.
F. CHINA 
Dechezleprête et al.’s econometric analysis shows that factors 
captured by the dummy variable CHINA have significant negative
impact on technology transfer to China.  This variable captures factors 
not taken into account by other country-level variables, namely: 
GDP_GROWTH, TECH_CAPABILITY, TRADE, and FDI_INFLOWS.181 
Findings about GDP_GROWTH, and TECH_CAPABILITY are discussed
above.182  This section, therefore, analyzes findings concerning TRADE
and FDI_INFLOWS and then discusses what other factors may be
captured by CHINA. 
1. TRADE and FDI_INFLOWS
Dechezleprête et al. use TRADE to measure a host country’s trade 
openness. The variable is defined to measure the sum of a host 
country’s exports and imports of merchandise divided by the country’s 
GDP in the same year.  The authors use FDI_INFLOWS to measure the
share of FDI inflows in a host country’s GDP.183 
Dechezleprête et al. expected both variables to have positive impact
on CDM-related technology transfer to a host country because strong 
empirical evidence indicates that trade openness and FDI promote
international technology transfer.184  But the econometric analysis yields
different results. While, as expected, a host country’s trade openness 
179. See, e.g., Jayshree Bajoria, Financial Crisis May Worsen Poverty in China,
India, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Nov. 20, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17812/
financial_crisis_may_worsen_poverty_in_china_india.html. 
180. See China’s Carbon Trading Market Potential, BUS. DAILY UPDATE, Sept. 16,
2008. 
181. See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 710. 
182. See supra Part II.A, B.
183. See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 708.  Both variables use the 
average values of the corresponding calculations for years 2000 to 2004. Id.
184. See id.
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(TRADE) has a positive impact on CDM-related technology transfer, the 
share of FDI inflows in the host country’s GDP (FDI_INFLOWS) is 
found to have negative impact.185  Similar impacts are found in the case
of China (see Figure 1). Dechezleprête et al. provide no further 
discussion of TRADE and suggest, without elaboration, that their finding 
about FDI_INFLOWS “may be due to the fact that capital links are 
already captured by the variable SUBSIDIARY.”186  The following 
paragraphs attempt to add some insights. 
a. TRADE
TRADE is found to have positive impact on CDM-related technology 
transfer to China, but the impact is smaller than that generated by 
GDP_GROWTH, TECH_CAPABILITY, and PROJECT_SIZE and is 
very close to that generated by CREDIT_BUYER. 
The positive impact of China’s trade openness is limited because 
while China is quite open to exports, it is actually not that open to 
imports.  In 2007, China’s exports accounted for 41.4% of its GDP 
(ranked 69th out of the 134 economies studied in the GCI 2008– 
2009).187  In the same year, China’s imports accounted for 33.1% of its
GDP (ranked 93rd out of the 134 economies).188  The primary reason for 
China’s relatively lower level of imports compared with other countries 
is that the country has significant trade barriers.  Overall, the effective
trade-weighted tariff rate on imports to China is over 14%, putting the 
country in the 122nd position on this indicator of the GCI Index.189 
With respect to clean technologies, the World Bank studied in 2007
that China’s tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers could be as high as 
15% and 25% respectively.190 Compared with some other top 
greenhouse gas emitting developing nations, China’s barriers were not 
extremely high. For example, Brazil’s tariff barriers and non-tariff 
barriers could be as high as 18% and 145% respectively, whereas the 
185. See id. at 709.
186. See id.
187. See GCR, supra note 32, at 474. 
188. See id. at 473. 
189. See id. at 430–31. 
190. See Tim Wilson, Undermining Mitigation Technology: Compulsory Licensing, 
Patents and Tariffs, INST. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, Aug. 2008, at 8 (referring to data included in 
International Trade and Climate Change: Economic, Legal and Institutional Perspectives
(World Bank 2007)). 
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respective percentages in India were 15% and 102%.191 However, 
compared with high income OECD countries that only imposed at most 
4% tariffs and set up zero non-tariff barriers, China was doing poorly.192 
The World Bank concluded in the study that tariffs and non-tariff
barriers had impeded the transfer of clean technologies and their
elimination could result in as much as 14% increase in the diffusion of 
these technologies.193 
Apparently the Chinese government is aware of the inconsistencies 
between the country’s trade barriers and its policies of promoting more 
transfer of clean technologies. China’s Ministry of Finance announced
in December 2008 that tariffs on specific items would be adjusted to 
support, among other sectors, “technologies that will benefit industrial 
upgrading and equipment manufacturing,” as well as “energy and
environment conservation.”194 
b. FDI_INFLOWS
A possible explanation of the negative impact of FDI_INFLOWS is 
that the more FDI in clean technology a host country can attract, the 
more difficult it is for a developer of a CDM project to satisfy the
“additionality” requirement in the approval process, and, as a result, the 
lower the CDM-related technology transfer rate is.195  In the case of 
China, the country’s favorable policies on FDI in clean technology are, 
as discussed above, reflected in the 2007 Catalogue.196  In fact, FDI in 
China, which has ranged between 2 and 4% of the country’s GDP since 
the early 1990s, has been important to China particularly because of its
role as the country’s vehicle to access technology and managerial
skills.197 
The negative correlation between FDI and CDM-related technology 
transfer merits further research by adding a new variable, 
FDI_CLEANTECH, to Dechezleprête et al.’s econometric model. 
Unlike FDI_INFLOWS, which measures the share of all FDI inflows, 
regardless of the investment sectors, in a host country’s GDP,




193. See id. 
194. China to Keep General Tariff Level at 9.8 Percent in 2009: Ministry, XINHUA
ECON. NEWS SERV., Dec. 18, 2008, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchin 
a/2008-12/18/content_7317990.htm. 
195. For discussion of the additionality requirement, see supra Part II.C. 
196. See supra Part II.A.
197. See Mid-term Evaluation, supra note 43, at 1. 
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A more rigorous approach is to use different variables to measure FDI 
in different types of clean technology. In this case, the negative 
correlation between FDI in a certain type of clean technology and the 
number of CDM projects of the same type involving technology transfer 
is likely to be more apparent.  Dechezleprête et al. find that SECTOR, a 
dummy variable which captures sector-specific characteristics that are
not captured by other variables, has negative impact on CDM-related
technology transfer.198  They also find the same pattern in the case of 
China (see Figure 1), but offer no explanation.199  In Seres’s study, he
shows that different sectors display different trends of technology 
transfer (increases, decreases, or irregular trends).200 All of this means
that little information is available now to draw any meaningful conclusion, 
and rigorous study, as proposed here, may be useful. 
2. Factors Captured by CHINA 
Dechezleprête et al. show that factors captured by CHINA have 
significant negative impact on China CDM projects.  They conclude that
these factors—not captured by TRADE, FDI_INFLOWS, GDP_GROWTH, 
and TECH_CAPABILITY—play a strong role in explaining country
differences.201 But apart from suggesting that these factors may reflect 
administrative peculiarities such as differences in the intellectual
property protection mechanisms and in the national CDM policies,
Dechezleprête et al. provide no further discussion.202  This section fills
this gap by highlighting a few major problems in China that contribute 
to the negative impact of CHINA on CDM-related technology transfer. 
a. Technology Transfer Not Mandatory
Under the CDM, a host country can decide whether or not technology
transfer is mandatory.  In his study, Seres finds that if a host country
adopts mandatory technology transfer as a criterion in its CDM approval 




See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 708–09. 




See Seres, supra note 6, § 13. 
See Dechezleprête et al. 2009, supra note 6, at 710. 
 See id.
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Seres focused on four countries: Brazil, China, India, and South
Korea. These four countries’ CDM projects account for 72% of all the 
3,296 registered or proposed projects analyzed in Seres’s study, and they
represent almost 80% of the annual emission reductions.203  Among 
these four countries, South Korea is the only country that adopts
mandatory technology transfer requirement for the CDM approval 
process. The requirement prescribed by the South Korean authorities is
that “environmentally sound technologies and know how shall be 
transferred.”204  Technology transfer for South Korean projects is found 
to be above the average measured in both the share of projects (49% vs.
36%) and the share of annual emission reductions (82% vs. 59%)(see 
Table C). Technology transfer for projects in Brazil, China, and India 
are all below average in these measures (Table C).205 
TABLE C 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CLAIMS AS PERCENT OF





South Korea 49 82
Average 36 59
For the case of China, Article 10 of the Measures provides that “CDM
project activities should  (ying) promote the transfer of environmentally
sound technology to China.”206  The word  should, instead of shall, is
used. This clearly shows that the provision does not impose any
mandatory requirement for technology transfer to China.207 
203. See Seres, supra note 6, § 6.
204. See id., at 9, citing Yeon-Sang Lee, The DNA & Focal Point Workshop:
Implementation in Korea (May 26–27, 2006).  In Seres’s report, the citation is: “Lee, 
Yeon-Sang. 2006. CDM Implementation in Korea. Presentation made at the DNA and 
Focal Point Workshop (Mar. 27–28). Vancouver, BC, Canada.” 
205.  See id.§ 6, tbl. 4.
206. Measures, supra note 49, art. 10 (emphasis added). 
207. See also Wang Rui, Clean Development Mechanism: Untapped Potential, 
China Law Insight (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2008/11/articles 
/corporate/foreign-investment/clean-development-mechanism-untapped-potential/ (for a 
similar comment on the lack of mandatory requirement for technology transfer to China).
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b. Unclear Regulatory Framework
Although CDM projects are regulated mostly by the Measures, these 
projects still need, as stipulated in Article 6 of the Measures, to be 
“consistent with China’s laws and regulations, sustainable development 
strategies and policies, and the overall requirements for national economic 
and social development planning.”208  If a project, for instance, involves
the establishment of a joint venture between a Chinese party and a
foreign party, relevant foreign investment laws and regulations apply.  If 
the project also involves a construction project, laws and regulations in
this area must be followed.  In fact, Article 19 of the Measures explicitly 
provides that “existing other relevant rules and procedures for the
approval of construction projects shall apply to CDM projects.”209 
All of these requirements sound reasonable, but they could in practice 
discourage interested parties, including foreign technology companies,
from getting involved in China’s CDM projects. China’s laws and
regulations have often been criticized for their inadequate transparency 
and consistency.210 Ensuring that CDM projects are consistent with 
China’s laws and regulations could be challenging and sometimes 
frustrating.211 Ensuring that CDM projects are in line with “sustainable
development strategies and policies, and the overall requirements for 
national economic and social development planning” could be an extra 
burden because many of these strategies, policies, and requirements are
vague and changed quite rapidly. Prospective project developers may
find it necessary to consult different government agencies to ascertain
the most up-to-date requirements.  Currently, regarding “sustainable 
development strategies and policies,” China’s CDM Board considers 
favorably proposed projects that fall within any of the three priority
areas: energy efficiency improvement, development and utilization of
new and renewable energy, and methane recovery and utilization.212
 208. Measures, supra note 49, art. 6. 
209. Id. art. 19. 
210. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce, supra note 40, at 39; DLA Piper, supra
note 151; Dubuis, supra note 141. See generally  CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS, NEW CHALLENGES (Donald C. Clarke ed. 2008); JANA KING ALLEN,
PRACTICING TRANSPARENCY: FOREIGN LAWYERS IN CHINA’S TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY (VDM
Verlag 2008). 
211. For a detailed discussion of the “uncertain and nebulous” legal framework 
governing refuse-derived fuel projects, see Marco Carone & Edward Lehman, Refuse-
Derived Fuel Projects in China from a Legal Perspective, CHINA L. & PRAC., July 2008.
212. Measures, supra note 49, art. 4; See DLA Piper, supra note 151, at 2. 
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Two examples illustrate how confusing the application of the
Measures could be, let alone the application of other laws, regulations, 
and policies. These two examples concern the rule that restricts foreign 
investors to hold no more than 49% of shares of the CDM project 
company in China.  First, although an equity joint venture in which the 
foreign partner can have more than a 49% equity share is clearly 
ineligible for owning a CDM project, would a CJV that formally meets 
the “Chinese-held” criterion but allows the foreign partner to control the 
decision-making process be disqualified?  At issue is that according to 
Chinese law,213 the decision process and the profit distribution of a CJV 
do not need to reflect the respective capital contributions made by the 
parties but can be subject to their negotiation. The NDRC, which is 
responsible for the interpretation of the Measures,214 has not given a
clear answer to this question.215 
Second, are Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwanese enterprises operating 
in mainland China considered foreign companies because they are so
treated under China’s foreign investment laws?216  Chinese authorities
have given mixed signals, leading to different advice rendered by
experienced attorneys.217  The situation seems to have been clarified in 
April 2009 when the Hong Kong government announced that the NDRC 
had “reinterpreted” the rules to allow Hong Kong companies to run
China’s CDM projects without restrictions on equity holding.  To be 
eligible, the Hong Kong company (1) must be registered in Hong Kong 
and must have its main business location and headquarters in the city; 
(2) must be run by an executive director who is a Chinese national or 
Hong Kong permanent resident or must have a board of directors with at 
least half of the members who are Chinese nationals or Hong Kong 
permanent residents; and (3) must have at least 50% of its shares
213. Law on Chinese-Foreign Co-operative Joint Ventures (adopted Apr. 13, 1988, 
amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., amended Oct. 31, 2000). 
214. Measures, supra note 49, art. 25. 
215. See Dubuis, supra note 141. 
216. According to the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement and its supplements
signed by China’s Ministry of Commerce and the Hong Kong government, Hong Kong 
companies do enjoy preferential access to certain industries in mainland China.  See, e.g.,
Baker & McKenzie, Status of Hong Kong Companies under China’s Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) Rules: Close to a Breakthrough?, Client Alert, Apr. 2009,
http://www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/A9645974-EE51-46E0-BAA7-8BD1628E2D84/0/
hk_statusofcompaniesunderCDMrules_ca_apr09.pdf. 
217. Some attorneys advised that Chinese authorities had confirmed that Hong 
Kong, Macau and Taiwanese enterprises were considered domestic companies. See
DLA Piper, supra note 151; Dubuis, supra note 141.  Other attorneys advised the opposite. 
See Zhang, supra note 151; Melinda Xie & Monica Mo, The Green Paper; Eversheds’
China Renewable Energy Bulletin; Clean Development Mechanism, Mondaq Business
Briefing, Sept. 5, 2008. 
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classified as non-circular, if the company is a publicly tradable 
company.218  Nevertheless, at the time of writing this article, the NDRC
has not issued any formal document to confirm this “reinterpretation.” 
c. Ineffective Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
Ineffective protection of intellectual property (IP) rights in developing
countries is often cited as a barrier to the transfer of clean 
technologies.219 Foreign investors and their governments have shared
concern over China’s weak IP protection mechanism.  In a 2008 survey 
of 122 business executives in the United States, 53.8% saw little way to 
control IP theft in China.220 Approximately 72% of these executives had
operations in China and found the IP protection issue one of their top
three concerns.221 
The Commission of the European Communities has also warned 
European companies to guard against unwanted loss of technology and 
IP rights in China.222 Similarly, while the U.S. Department of Commerce 
encourages U.S. businesses to tap into China’s enormous clean
technology market, it points out that “IP theft [in China] remains a major 
challenge to U.S. companies” and highlights the problem of “patent 
squatting.”223  The problem generally refers to the situation where many 
U.S. inventors fail to file for Chinese patents, allowing opportunists to 
review information disclosed in the U.S. patent filings and file for 
Chinese patents to claim rights against the inventors.  From 1985 to 
2008, parties from the United States obtained a total number of 71,848
218. See Cheung Chi-fai, Mainland Allows H.K. Firms to Run Green Projects; 
Relaxed Rules Give Conditional Access to Greenhouse Gas Market, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 8, 2009; Baker & McKenzie, supra note 216. 
219. See, e.g., Steven Knell, Investor IP Concerns Hamper Climate Change Effort 
in China, Global Insight, May 17, 2007.  For a recent discussion of the topic, see John 
Barton, Patenting and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries, 
WIPO MAGAZINE, Apr. 2009, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/
02/article_0005.html.
220. See BTI Consulting, 2008 Annual Survey Results: Doing Business in China
(2008).
221. “Fraud and corruption” and “government stability and control” are the first two
top concerns.  See id. 
222. See The Comm’n of the European Communities, Technology Transfer To
China: Guidance For Businesses, Technology Transfer To China —Why Worry?, China 
IPR SME Help Desk, 2008, http://www.chinaiprhelpdesk.eu/media/docs/Tech_transf 
er_English.pdf.
223. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 40, at 39. 
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Chinese patents, lagging behind Japan (147,687).  This is mainly because 
U.S. parties filed fewer Chinese patent applications (197,312) than their
Japanese counterparts (300,141),224 even though the former have
consistently submitted the highest number of international patent 
applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty.225 
Patent squatting could occur because many U.S. parties did not know 
the differences between the patent protection system in China and that in 
the United States.226  The United States follows the “first-to-invent” 
system to ensure that a patent be granted only to the inventor.227  By  
contrast, China follows the “first-to-file” system, under which the first 
applicant to file for patent protection is usually awarded the patent.228 
Until recently, China adopted limited novelty requirements, under which
patent protection could be barred if, prior to the filing date, a public use 
or knowledge of an invention had occurred inside China.  In other  
words, such use or knowledge outside China did not bar patent 
protection.229 
These concerns about China’s poor IP protection record contribute to
the low transfer rate of advanced technologies to the country.  For 
example, the U.S. ethanol industry does not transfer its latest biological 
enzyme technology to China.  But the industry transfers pre-treatment 
techniques for cellulosic ethanol because the technology is no longer 
advanced and the industry is, therefore, not concerned about competition 
from China.230  However, if suppliers believe that they can retain control
over their core technologies, these technologies may still be transferred
to a country with poor IP record such as China.231  For example, General 
224. See State Intellectual Property Office, 2008 Annual Report, http://www.
sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/annualreports/AnnualReport2008/200906/P02009062334
0212540009.pdf. 
225. See Trends in PCT Filings: Leading Countries, WIPO Statistics Database, Apr. 2009, 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/pct/xls/qs_leadingcountries.xls. 
226. See, e.g., Kevin J. Zilka & Dominic M. Kotab, Patent Novelty Requirements of 
the World and Strategic Foreign Patent Procurement Practices, 2003, http://zilkakotab.
com/PDFs/publication1.pdf. 
227. See, e.g., id. at 3.
228. See, e.g., id. at 5.
229. Patent Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar.
12, 1984, revised Sept. 4, 1992, Aug. 25, 2000, and Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009)
LAWINFOCHINA, art. 22, http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=7289& 
keyword=Patent%20Law [hereinafter Revised Patent Law.  The most recent amendment to 
the Patent Law, which came into effect on October 1, 2009, adopts the absolute novelty
standard. See infra text accompanying notes 236–37. 
230. See generally M. Mani, Warming up to Trade? Harnessing International 
Trade to Support Climate Change Objectives, World Bank Group (2007). 
231. See John H Barton, Technology Transfer: Cooperation or Competition?, 
CHINADIALOGUE.NET, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/
en/1609. 
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Motors committed $250 million to an advanced research center in
Shanghai to support the development of energy-efficient and 
environmentally friendly transportation alternatives.  General Motors 
reportedly said that the company could “keep control of [its] intellectual
property in China even while doing cutting-edge research.”232 
While more experienced corporations such as General Motors seem to
have strategies to guard against IP theft, the same cannot be said about
many venture-capital backed enterprises, a leading force of innovative 
clean technologies, because these start-ups do not have the experience,
knowledge, or resources to adopt similar strategies.233 Moreover, foreign 
investors often adopt an IP protection strategy by setting up wholly
owned entities to run their operations in China.234  The fact that China’s
Measures prohibit foreign investors from owning more than 49% of the 
CDM project company makes it impossible to use this strategy.  All of 
these limitations in IP protection give support to a leading Chinese law 
firm’s observation that even if technology transfer takes place, 
technologies imported to China under the CDM projects are often 
second or third class in exporting countries.235 
China’s recent amendment to the Patent Law ameliorates some concerns
expressed by foreign investors.236  For example, the amendment adopts
the absolute novelty standard, under which a Chinese patent can only be 
given to an invention that is totally new worldwide.237  It also increases 
the maximum amount for statutory compensation in China from RMB0.5
million to RMB1 million.238 
The amendment to the Patent Law, however, also worsens foreign 
investors’ concerns by providing a stronger statutory basis for
“compulsory licensing.”239  For example, under the revised Patent Law,
232. See Kenneth Markowitz, Technology Transfer: A Pillar of Climate Change
Solutions, Reuters Interactive Carbon Market Community, Nov. 5 2007, http://www.
reutersinteractive.com/Carbon/80466. 
233. See China Industry: Wanted: Clean-Tech Firms, supra note 115. 
234. See Gordon Orr, What Executives Are Asking about China, McKinsey Q.
Special Edition, 2004, at 16. 
235. See Rui, supra note 207. 
236. Revised Patent Law, supra note 229. See Weishi Li, China Amends Patent Law, 
Jan. 7, 2009, http://www.omm.com/china-amends-patent-law-01-07-2009/; Benjamin Bai et 
al., What Does the Third Amendment to China’s Patent Law Mean to You?, Jones Day
Commentaries, Jan. 2009, http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S5806. 
237. Revised Patent Law, supra note 229, art. 22.
238. Id. art. 65. 
239. Id. arts. 48–58. 
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the Chinese government may grant a compulsory license to a third party 
to use the patent if: (1) a patent holder has failed, without reasonable 
grounds, to exploit or sufficiently exploit the patent within three years 
after the issuance of the patent and four years after the filing of the 
patent application; or (2) the patent holder exploits the patent in a 
manner determined to be monopolistic behavior according to the law.240 
In addition, the new Patent Law goes beyond the standard—“for the 
treatment of contagious diseases”—prescribed in the Measures to
Implement Public Health-Related Compulsory Licensing to allow 
compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals for public health purposes.241 
These new provisions enhance the Chinese government’s ability to use 
compulsory licenses to produce patented products such as HIV/AIDS 
drugs and clean technologies without permission. Although the government 
has stated that it will be highly cautious in using the compulsory
licensing clauses and will likely use them to merely negotiate with 
international pharmaceutical companies on their drug prices, companies
with these technologies are unlikely to see these words as guarantees.242 
China, like many other developing countries, justifies the need for 
using compulsory licensing to get access to clean technologies on the 
basis that the country cannot otherwise afford them.243 Findings in
Seres’s study suggest that this justification is open to question. Seres 
finds that thirteen of the twenty-six project types have at least ten
projects that involve technology transfer.244  Agriculture, biogas, and 
biomass energy are three examples of these thirteen project types.245  All
of the thirteen types have their technologies supplied by companies from
at least six countries.246  Some of these types even have suppliers from
more than twenty countries.247  Among the project types that have a
sufficient number of projects for analysis, Seres finds that project 
developers often have several prospective domestic or foreign suppliers 
240. Id. art. 48. 
241. Id. art. 50;  Measures to Implement Public Health-Related Compulsory Licensing
(promulgated by the State Intellectual Property Office, Nov. 29, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006),
available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=31889. 
242. See Posting of Jia Hepeng to Intellectual Property Watch, and Yuan Yue, Revised 
Chinese Patent Law Aims at Quality, Compulsory Licensing, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
WATCH (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=1394&print=1;
Chamber Fears Climate Talks Could Set Stage for TRIPS Changes, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 
15, 2009, at 1, available at http://ourworldisnotforsale.org/en/article/chamber-fears-climate-
talks-could-set-stage-trips-changes.
243. See, e.g., Hong, supra note 11. 
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to choose from, and none of these suppliers dominates the market to
restrict the distribution of the technology or keep the price high.248 
These findings, along with the fact that compulsory licensing will 
likely prompt concerned investors and innovators to be more hesitant in 
making their technologies available in countries with such licensing, 
should alert developing countries, including China, to reconsider 
whether compulsory licensing is indeed warranted.249 
d. Other Factors 
A few other factors in China also help explain the negative impact of 
CHINA on CDM-related technology transfer.  First, China has policies 
that require CDM project developers to source a high percentage of their 
equipment from Chinese firms.  For example, project developers of wind
power projects must purchase at least 80% of their equipment from 
Chinese firms.250  Foreign suppliers of more advanced wind turbines
complain that this limits their opportunity to enter the Chinese market.251 
Chen Deming, Vice-Director of the NDRC, defended the policy: “If we 
want to reduce the cost of wind power, we need to use relatively 
advanced and relatively cheap equipment, and if we are using just
248. See id. See also John H. Barton, Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy
Technologies in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel, and Wind
Technologies (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 
2, 2007), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/New%202009/CC%20Barton.pdf. Barton
finds that developing countries have access to solar photovoltaic and wind technologies at
competitive prices.  As observed by Seres, Barton’s finding with respect to wind technologies 
is consistent with the data presented in Table 11 of Seres’s study.  As regards solar 
photovoltaic technologies, the number of solar projects analyzed in Seres’s study is too small 
to support or reject Barton’s conclusion. 
249. For a recent discussion of whether compulsory licensing helps the transfer of 
clean technologies, see Nitya Nanda, Diffusion of Climate Friendly Technologies: Can
Compulsory Licensing Help?, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 241 (May 2009), available at
http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789/4193/1/JIPR%2014%283%29%202
41-246.pdf. 
250. See David Stanway, Chinese Regulatory Hurdles Still Hinder Foreign Wind
Power Firms, XINHUA FINANCIAL NETWORK NEWS, Oct. 12, 2007. 
251. See id. The complaints made by foreign suppliers of more advanced wind
turbines are real concerns because almost all wind projects in China are CDM projects. 
See Wara and Victor, supra note 129, at 13. 
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expensive foreign equipment, that won’t be possible.”252  Similar China-
content policies are reportedly quite common in other sectors.253 
Second, foreign companies with advanced clean technologies often 
see CDM projects as the first step to tap into China’s bigger clean
technology market. But the Ministry of Commerce’s recent decision to 
prohibit the Coca-Cola Company from acquiring Huiyuan Juice Group, a 
well-known domestic brand, has heightened foreign investors’ concern 
that China appears to have broadly interpreted its Antimonopoly Law to 
fend off foreign acquisitions of well-known local businesses.254 This
precedent does not help convince foreign companies of clean technologies
that the long-term prospects of investing in China’s clean technology 
market are promising.
Third, China’s financing barriers make it difficult for foreign companies 
of clean technologies to expand their operations in China. Two
commentators call China’s financial system “inherently biased against
clean energy investing” because of various barriers, including the 
country’s “confiscatory tax policy.”255  In fact, China’s weak financial 
market places the country in the 109th position (out of the 134
economies) on this indicator of GCI.  This indicator covers the following 
items:
i. Financial market sophistication (83/134);256 
ii. Financing through local equity market (80/134);257 
iii. Ease of access to loans (99/134);258 
iv. Venture capital availability (49/134);259 
v. Restriction on capital flows (121/134);260 
vi. Strength of investor protection (67/134);261 
vii. Soundness of banks (108/134);262
 252. Stanway, supra note 250. 
253. See Lewis, supra note 78, at 164; U.S.–China Business Council, Foreign
Investment in China, Feb. 2007, http://www.uschina.org/info/forecast/2007/foreign-
investment.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2009). 
254. See Stephen Mulrenan, Storm in a Juice Cup, CHINA L. & PRAC., Apr. 2009, at
9; Zhan Hao, Coca-Cola and Huiyuan: Explanation, Theory, An Attempt to Rationalise?, 
CHINA L. & PRAC., May 2009, at 26. 
255. CHANDLER & GWIN, supra note 156, at 8 (identifying four major barriers to
clean energy finance in China: “restrictions on debt financing,” “restrictions on foreign equity
investments,” “asymmetric policies at the central and local levels,” and “confiscatory tax 
policy”). 
256. See GCR, supra note 32, at 450. 
257. See id. at 451. 
258. See id. at 452. 
259. See id. at 453. 
260. See id. at 454. 
261. See id. at 455. 
262. See id. at 456. 
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viii. Regulation of securities exchanges (109/134);263 
ix. Legal rights index (93/134).264 
Except for the availability of venture capital, China is ranked low on all
items.
China has recently taken steps to remove some financing barriers.  For 
example, the new Implementing Regulations for PRC Enterprise Income
Tax Law came into effect in January 2008 to, among other things, grant 
qualified enterprises tax exemption for three years, followed by three-
year taxation at 50% of the full tax rate.265  Qualified enterprises include
those engaging in projects involving power stations utilizing renewable 
energy or projects involving environmental protection and energy
conservation.266 These steps are welcome and will likely help the
operations of foreign clean technology companies in China, and thereby,
technology transfer.  Research in this area is warranted when more data 
becomes available. 
In sum, GDP_GROWTH is the biggest driver of CDM-related
technology transfer to China because clean technologies companies from 
developed countries are willing to transfer some technologies to tap into 
China’s enormous CDM and clean technology markets, which are the 
result of the country’s strong policy and regulatory framework on energy
efficiency and environmental protection.  Such a strong policy and 
regulatory framework is, in turn, primarily due to the leaders’ interest in
promoting the country’s economic development. 
TECH_CAPABILITY is the second biggest driver because China’s 
relatively good technological capabilities facilitate technology transfer 
by enabling the country to use transferred technologies relatively easily. 
China has strengthened its technological capabilities because of its 
emphasis on science and technology.  These capabilities, together with 
increased diffusion of technologies transferred to China through earlier
CDM projects or other investments, help China evolve to be a source of 
clean technologies. Despite these improvements, China still lacks the 
263. See id. at 457. 
264. See id. at 458. 
265. Implementing Regulations for PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law (promulgated
by the State Council, Dec. 6, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), art. 87, translated at CHINA L.
& PRAC., Feb. 2008. 
266. See Liu Yi & Wang Yaxun, Policy Plans For Renewable Energy Project 
Financing, CHINA L. & PRAC., Apr. 2009, at 25. 
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latest technologies, and the country can still benefit from international 
technology transfer. 
PROJECT_SIZE has a positive impact on CDM-related technology
transfer to China.  This correlation is partly due to the presence of mega-
sized HFC-23 projects that usually involve technology transfer, but is 
mainly due to the fact that larger projects can exploit economies of scale 
to stay viable throughout the costly and risky CDM approval process.  In
light of these costs and risks, the opportunities presented by the highly 
profitable and relatively less risky HFC-23 projects make smaller, but 
environmentally valuable, projects look even less attractive. 
CREDIT_BUYER has a limited positive impact on technology transfer 
to China because China does not offer favorable terms to optimize credit 
buyers’ involvement.  These buyers cannot own CERs or share revenue 
generated from the sales of CERs.  The CER price is subject to review
by the Chinese authorities, whose suspected reliance on an informal base 
price renders the review process uncertain.  In addition, the CDM in 
China does not provide credit buyers with incentives to commit to
paying the full price prior to project registration. 
Inconsistent with the global trend, SUBSIDIARY has no impact on
CDM-related technology transfer to China because various protectionism- 
driven barriers discourage foreign investors from participating in China 
CDM projects. These barriers include those created by local 
governments, the ban on foreign enterprises’ majority ownership of 
CDM projects, the prohibition on foreign investors’ preferred stock
investment, and the prohibition on foreign investors to collect an interest
rate commensurate with risks involved on any shareholder loan made by 
the investors. 
TRADE has a limited, though positive, impact on CDM-related 
technology transfer to China because while China is quite open to 
exports, it is actually not that open to imports, as reflected in the 
country’s significant tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
The unexpected negative impact of FDI_INFLOWS is possibly related 
to CDM’s additionality requirement.  The logic is that the more FDI in 
clean technology a host country can attract, the more difficult a 
developer of a CDM project can satisfy the “additionality” requirement 
in the approval process, and, as a result, the lower the CDM-related
technology transfer rate is.  Because of inadequate information, more 
research should be conducted to focus on trends displayed by different
sectors.  Additional research would also help explain the negative impact
of SECTOR as found by Dechezleprête et al. 
CHINA has a significant negative impact on CDM-related technology
transfer. This is likely due to a few major problems in China, including 
the failure to use technology transfer as a mandatory requirement in the 
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country’s CDM approval process, an unclear CDM regulatory framework, 
the country’s ineffective protection of IP rights, the requirement to use a 
high percentage of Chinese equipment to implement CDM projects, and 
the difficulty for foreign companies to expand their operations in China 
because of the Antimonopoly Law and financing barriers.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The future of the CDM remains unclear.  Some experts and 
governments have called for its abolition.267 Others have suggested that
it be kept in the post-Kyoto framework but fundamental reforms must be 
implemented.268  It is beyond the scope of this article to compare all the
strengths of the CDM with its weaknesses.  This article only examines
the role of the CDM in the transfer of clean technologies to developing
countries. In this context, Part II has shown major problems with the 
current CDM. If the UNFCCC decides to keep the CDM in the post-
Kyoto framework, reforms must be undertaken to strengthen the role of 
the mechanism in technology transfer to developing countries.  In 
addition, much can be done by developing countries, including China 
itself, to create domestic environments favorable to international 
technology transfer. 
A. Lessons for Developing Countries 
Based on China’s experience, developing countries should take at
least the following steps to create a favorable environment for the
transfer of clean technologies: 
267. See, e.g., Padmaparna Ghosh & Jacob Koshy, Europe Wants Emission Caps for 
India, China, MINT, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.livemint.com/2009/02/09001108/Europe-
wants-emission-caps-for.html.
268. See White Paper, supra note 11, at 50; Li Jing, China Issues Post-Kyoto Plans 
on Climate Change, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 30, 2008, at 2, available at http://www. chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2008-10/30/content_7156216.htm; Anne Eckstein, Climate Change: EU
Executive Puts Its Pawns in Place for International Talks, EUROPOLITICS ENERGY, Feb. 
11, 2009 (reporting that the European Commission has called for the reform of the CDM 
by using a sectoral crediting mechanism); Julio Godoy, Climate Change: A Development 
Mechanism That Cleans Little, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 18, 2009 (reporting that Lambert
Schneider, a leading expert on CDM, opined that the mechanism should be radically
reformed and eventually be eliminated).
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1. Establish a strong policy and regulatory framework on energy
efficiency and environmental protection to create investment 
opportunities to lure companies of clean technologies from 
developed countries. 
Although China’s shares of both the CDM and the clean technology
markets are enormous, the pie is big enough for other developing
countries to enjoy.  Two studies have calculated that in order to save our 
planet from irreversible damage, approximately $500 billion needs to be
invested in renewable energy and energy efficiency every year until 
2030.269  Over the past two years, the annual global investment in this
area has been about $150 billion only.270  Specifically, the International
Energy Agency has found that $44 trillion should be invested in clean
technologies from 2010 to 2050 to ensure a climate-safe future.271 
Developing countries should have incentives to create these investment
opportunities through the establishment of a strong policy and regulatory
framework on energy efficiency and environmental protection. These 
opportunities would help invigorate their economies currently troubled 
by the global financial crisis.  It is largely for this reason that a few 
countries have dedicated a large portion of their stimulus packages to
green initiatives.272  South Korea (81%) and the European Union (59%)
are good examples.273  China (38%) and the United States (12%), the
two largest greenhouse gas emitting countries, dedicate smaller portions 
of their packages to green projects, but, in terms of volume, China 
outperforms all other countries by committing $221.3 billion, followed
by the United States ($112.3 billion).274 
2. Focus on science and technology to strengthen the country’s
technological capabilities to facilitate technology transfer. 
3. Offer credit buyers favorable terms to optimize their
involvement in CDM projects.  In particular, unlike China, 
these countries should allow these buyers to own CERs or 
share revenue generated from the sales of CERs.  To create
less uncertainty to credit buyers, the CER price agreed upon by 
269. See Padmaparna Ghosh, Downturn Takes a Heavy Toll on Investments in Clean 
Tech, MINT, May 12, 2009, http://www.livemint.com/2009/05/11215744/Downturn-takes-a-
heavy-toll-on.html (referring to the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 
2008 and a 2006 report written by economist Nicholas Stern). 
270. See id. (referring to New Energy Finance data). 
271. See also Michael Richardson, Recession a Setback for Climate Change Talks,
THE STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/mr11dec08.pdf. 
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the parties to a CDM project should be based on the parties’
assessment of project risks, instead of a base price set by the 
government. 
4. Remove investment restrictions imposed on subsidiaries of 
companies from Annex 1 nations.  For example, unlike China, 
developing countries should not prohibit these subsidiaries 
from owning more than 49% of the CDM project. 
5. Enhance the country’s trade openness to imports of clean
technologies by lowering its tariff and non-tariff barriers 
6. Strive to keep other country-specific problems to a minimum.
In particular, adopt technology transfer as a mandatory
requirement in the country’s CDM approval process, establish
a transparent and clearly defined CDM regulatory framework, 
improve the country’s protection of IP rights, and reduce 
financing and anti-competition barriers to allow foreign 
companies to expand their operations in the country. In
particular, developing countries should consider prudently
whether compulsory licensing of clean technologies, an antithesis 
to protection of IP rights and, thereby, a barrier to technology 
development and transfer, is indeed necessary, and whether it
might cause them more harm than benefit.  Empirical evidence
shows that in most CDM project types, none of the technology 
suppliers dominates the market to restrict the technology 
diffusion or to keep the price high.
B. Implications for the Post-Kyoto Framework 
The analysis in Part II also infers that the international community
should take the following measures to facilitate the CDM-related
technology transfer: 
1. Use Sectoral Approaches to Overcome Problems 
Arising from the Application of the      
Additionality Rule 
The positive impact of PROJECT_SIZE on CDM-related technology
transfer to China stems mainly from the fact that larger projects can
exploit economies of scale to stay viable during the costly and risky 
CDM approval process.  Although the CDM has taken a few measures to
speed up the process, such as adopting simplified procedures for small-
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scale projects and permitting similar projects to be bundled in one 
application, the backlog problem continues.  The real cause of the 
problem is the strict review of each project against the additionality
standard. However sensible the rationale behind this project-by-project 
application of the additionality rule is, the impediments such application 
has caused to potential developers of smaller but environmentally-sound
projects and the unfortunate failure of these utmost efforts to screen out 
“nonadditional” HFC-23 projects have proven the impracticality of the 
rule and the need to modify it. 
Sectoral approaches such as “sectoral CDM” and “sectoral no-lose
targets” have been considered as possible solutions to problems arising 
from the application of the additionality rule.275  Definitions of these
terms have varied in the literature.  But the “sectoral CDM” usually 
refers to a project-based mechanism that applies baselines set at the
business-as-usual (BAU) emission levels for different sectors, whereas
the “sectoral no-lose targets” usually refers to a mechanism that includes
the entire sector in the boundary and overall emissions in the sector are
credited against a baseline set below the BAU emission level.276 
Among the supporters of the sectoral approaches is Lex de Jonge, 
Vice Chairman of the CDM Executive Board, who said, 
I see how we struggle with [the CDM] within the board.  My feeling is that we 
manage to act on 400 to 500 projects on a yearly basis . . . But I don’t think it’s 
a sustainable process.  I would very much welcome it if we could move towards 
a more sectoral approach . . . If we could say this is the baseline on a sectoral
level, and you show your project is performing better than the baseline, and we
declare additionality based on emissions compared to the baseline, then that 
would be much easier.277 
275. See, e.g., Lambert Schneider and Martin Cames, A Framework for a Sectoral 
Crediting Mechanism in a Post-2012 Climate Regime: Report for the Global Wind Energy
Council, May 28, 2009, available at http://www. oeko.de/oekodoc/904/2009-022-en.pdf; 
Belgium: Post-Kyoto Climate Deal Takes Shape, TENDERSINFO, May 23, 2009; China: 
U.N. CO2 Scheme Needs Energy Efficiency Focus – Developer, TENDERSINFO, May 9,
2009; Dario Montero, Climate Change: Going Beyond the Carbon Market, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE, Apr. 2, 2009 (reporting that John Nash, senior economist of the World Bank, 
said, “The Clean Development Mechanism must be expanded, including actions . . . to 
promote sector-based programs and policies that can achieve the scale of emissions
reductions that we need”). 
276. For a good explanation of these terms, see Schneider and Cames, supra note 
275, at 7–8. 
277. Jing Yang, CDM Scheme Successful in China—Vice Chairman of U.N. CDM, 
CHINA ENERGY WEEKLY, Apr. 9, 2008. 
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Understandably, disagreements over where to draw the baseline for 
each sector are a major challenge.278  Critics suggest that companies or 
their governments have incentives to exaggerate their current BAU 
emissions, making it easy for them to go below these baselines and be
awarded CERs.279  Independent experts have a lot to contribute to ensure
that fair baselines are set.  Hopefully, the potential benefits resulting 
from sectoral approaches would help interested parties put aside their 
differences to reach some agreements.
2. Prevent Mega-Sized but Low-Value Projects from 
Dominating the CDM Market 
The positive correlation between PROJECT_SIZE and CDM-related 
technology transfer to China is also partly due to the presence of mega-
sized HFC-23 projects that usually involve transfer of simple
technologies. These low-cost but extremely high return projects have
naturally drawn investors from smaller, valuable projects.  The UNFCCC 
needs to learn from these lessons to prevent similar mega-sized projects
from coming into existence.  To achieve this, CERs should be allocated
to reflect not only the emission reduction value of a project but also its 
contribution to the transfer of clean technologies.  For this reason, the 
technology-CDM proposed by some specialists is worth considering. 
This new mechanism requires, among other things, the technology 
transfer goal to be clearly identified in the CDM application and allows 
CERs to be shared by the technology provider and the host country’s
government if it offers support to facilitate the technology transfer.280 
278. See Steven Gray, Carbon Finance and the Low Carbon Economy, CHINA
DIALOGUE, Dec. 8, 2008, http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/2611-
Carbon-finance-and-the-new-economy.
279. See, e.g., Leigh Phillips, Commission Warns Carbon Targets ‘Risk Falling
Short’ EUOBSERVER.COM, May 7, 2009, http://euobserver.com/885/28087. 
280. See Fei Teng et al.,  Possible Development of a Technology Clean
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3. Help Strengthen Developing Countries’ Technological      
Capabilities
TECH_CAPABILITY is the second biggest driver of technology
transfer to China because China’s good technological capabilities enable 
the country to use transferred technologies relatively easily.  China has 
made impressive investment in the development of science and technology,
but many other developing countries may not have the means to have 
similar investment.  According to the European Commission, there is a
need to at least double the global energy-related research and
development by 2012, and quadruple the current level by 2020, with
emphasis on such clean technologies as renewable energy sources.281 
At the Bali conference, China called for the establishment of an 
international fund to enhance mitigation, adaptation, research and 
development, and technology transfer in the developing world.282  Later,
China and G77 prepared a proposal on the same topic.283  In May 2009, 
China reiterated its stance in a position paper titled Implementation of 
the Bali Roadmap: China’s Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference. In the position paper, the Chinese government, apart from 
requesting developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
to at least 40% below 1990 levels by 2020, asks these countries to donate
at least 0.5 to 1% of their annual GDP to help developing countries upgrade
technology, cut emissions, and adapt to the consequences of climate 
change.284 
Understandably, the ongoing global financial crisis makes it harder for 
developed countries to accept this proposal. Yet, as discussed above,
China’s increased technological capabilities have also helped the country
evolve to be an exporter of technologies to benefit less developed 
nations. In light of these long-term benefits of helping developing countries 
to strengthen their technological capabilities, a fund that supports this 
cause should be seriously considered. 
281. See Serge Abou, Climate Change: EU, China Have Work to Do, CHINA DAILY, 
Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-04/28/content_7724203.htm.
282. See China Proposes a Technology Transfer Fund at Bali Talks, CHINA 
ECONOMIC REVIEW, Dec. 6, 2007, http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/dailybriefing/ 
2007_12_06/China_proposes_a_technology_transfer_fund_at_Bali_talks.html. 
283. See U. N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Proposal by the G77 &
China for a Technology Mechanism under the UNFCCC, (Sept. 28, 2008), http:// 
unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/technology_propo
sal_g77_8.pdf.
284. See Press Release, P.R.C., Implementation of the Bali Roadmap: China’s Position 
on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (May 20, 2009), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/
newsrelease/t20090521280382.htm. 
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Much of the success of the Copenhagen conference on climate change
depends on whether parties to the UNFCCC can agree upon a post-
Kyoto framework to facilitate the transfer of clean technologies from 
developed countries to the developing world.  This study has shown that 
both the international community and developing countries themselves 
could contribute significantly to the development of an international 
framework and national environments that favor international transfer of 
clean technologies. Collaboration, not confrontation, is the key to tackling 
climate change. 
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